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AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICIES AFFECTING
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, 1986-1988"
Mario B. Lamberte and Julius P. Relampagos**
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper assesses the performance of the Aquino
government in the financial sector. The first section presents
the major policies and strategies outlined by the government.
This is followed by a section that describes and analyzes the
actions taken by the government in relation to the policies and
strategies earlier spelled out. The third section assesses
quantitatively the results of the policies and strategies adopted
by the government in the financial sector. The fourth section
discusses some policy issues that need to be addressed Dy the
government.
II. MAJOR POLICIES AND STRATEGIES IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
The government's policies and strategies in the financial
sector" are clearly spelled out in the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan, 1987-1992. The updated version of the Plan
that was presented to the public in several hearings essentially
retains the major policies and strategies with some minor
modifications and additions. The following presents in toto the
*This is Chapter IV of a larger study conducted by PIDS that
reviews the performance of the Aquino Government on selected
policy areas from 1986-1988. The assistance of Ms. Merle Gonzales
and Ms. Nitz Tolentino for typing the draft is gratefully
acknowledged)
**Respectively, Vice-President and Research Associate, Phil-
ippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS).
government policies and strategies in the financial sector as
indicated in the Plan. We will indicate in the footnote whether
the policy statements are based on the original or updated
version of the Plan.
A. Improvement of the Financial Structure
Central Bank supervision and regulation of financial
institutions shall be improved to promote a stronger and more
stable financial system. To effectively pursue this, the Central
Bank's independence from the executive branch shall be
safeguarded. Freer entry into all•areas of banking and finance
shall be allowed to enhance efficient financial intermediation
through competition, subject toprudent requirements for the
protection of depositors. Furthermore, the Central Bank's
responsibility to stabilize interest rates, prices, and the
exchange rate shall be emphasized.
Consistent with the policy to cut down the overall size of
the public sector in the financial system, the size•and scope of
operations of government financial institutions (GFIs),
particularly the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), shall be reduced by 1988. To
further enhance the efficiency of these institutions through
greater market competition, special privileges extended by the
National Government •and the Central Bank shall •be •eliminated.
Steps shall be undertaken to increase private sector
participation in the management of these institutions to ensure
greater public accountability. In addition, the government shall
completely divest itself of at least the majority stockholdlngs
of the former privately-owned commercial banks • by the end of
198B._i/
B. Improvement of the Rural Credit Market
The development•of the rural financial markets, in tandem
with initiatives to improve the viability of the rural• sector,
shall be given emphasis. This will involve, in •the immediate
term, the rationalization and stremgthening of the rural banking
system to enable it to generate locally-sourced funds to support
its lending and other financial functions in the rural areas,
thus performing its lead role in agricultural development.
The transition towards a viable and self-sustaining rural
financiai structure which•• is capable of • performing efficient
intermediation functions will require an extensive review and
possible modification of policies that hinder the expansion of
financial services in the rural sector.
l_/
This last statement is taken from the Updated version of
the Plan.
3In addition, the strengthening of countryside banking shall
be accompanied and supported by adequate technical and
infrastructure support and other feasible and cost-efficient
mechanisms to reduce the risk and uncertainty of agri-oriented
endeavors, as well as to create a resurgent market for
agricultural loans. As a complementary measure, agricultural
research and the strengthening of market intelligence systems
will be pursued.
C. Rationalization of Government Regulations Affecting
Intermediation Cost
An environment conducive to investments and growth shall
continue to be encouraged. Government regulations affecting
banks' intermediation costs shall be rationalized, i.e., gradual
reduction in the reserve requirements when circumstances so
warrant. Moreover, further reduction in intermediation costs
through the repeal of the agri-agra requirements shall be
endorsed for legislative action. On the other hand, the gross
receipts tax shall be abolished within the Plan period, pending
the successful implementation of the value added tax. _2/
D. Continued Adoption of a Market-Determined Interest Rate
Policy
To enhance efficiency in financial intermediation, the
determination of interest rates shall continue to be left to
market forces. A positive real deposit rate will be maintained
to encourage holding of surplus funds to channel an increasing
portion of these funds to the banking system. _3/ The allocation
of credit to sectors through the imposition of interest rate
ceilings shall be resisted. All remaining forms of interest rate
sUbsidies to specific sectors (including the government) through
the Central Bank credit facilities shall be eliminated by 1987.
E. Development of the Domestic Capital Market
The intermediation and allocation of medium- and long-term
financial resources for economic growth shall be improved through
the development of the domestic capital markets. A favorable
climate for the increased volume of medium- and long-term savings
in the financial system will be provided by offering investors a
Varied choice of financial instruments and investment
opportunities. In particular, the securities markets shall be
strengthened to effectively mobilize sayings and channel them
into productive enterprises.
2--/
This paragraph is taken from the Updated version of the
Plan.
3-/
This was mentioned on p. 385 of the original version of
the Plan.
To stimulate long-term capital market development, the
government shall foster conditions conducive to a market
determination of interest rates. The shift in Central Bank
policies towards a market orientation in interest rates and away
from credit allocation or development financing subsidies and
fixed rates shall be continued.
The development of a secondary market for government
securities shall be actively pursued through improvements in
trading securities and the continued market determination of the
yield on government issues. The revival of the auction system
for the marketing of puDlicly-offered issues will ensure that
government securities are sold in an orderly but competitive
environment and that interest rates are really market-determined.
Interest-bearing bills of the Central Bank shall be gradually
withdrawn from the financial system in favor of market
competitive government securities that shall serve as the main
instruments for open market operations.
To achieve efficient placement and active trading of
marketable securities, accredited government securities dealers
shall be strengthened to ensure effective marketing at the
primary level, institutionalize secondary trading, and sustain
secondary market development.
F. Prudent Monetary Management
The movement of monetary aggregates shall continue to be
managed and closely monitored to help ensure consistency with
broad macroeconomic targets. Open market operations and
ad3ustments in reserve requirements shall be the major tools for
monetary management.
III. ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE MONETARY AUTHORITIES/EXECUTIVE BRANCH
AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT
With the reconstitution of the Congress, the monopoly of the
Monetary Authorities/Executive Branch in formulating monetary and
credit policies has ended. 4/ As may be gathered from the
numerous bills being filed in both the Senate and House, Congress
has definitely taken an aggressive stance as far as formulation
of economic policies in the country is concerned.
Reforms that require legislative actions have to be
initiated by Congress. For their part, the Monetary
Authorities/Executive Branch can initiate reforms only within the
4/
The Monetary Authorities and Exe _utive Branch of the
government are lumped together because at present, the Monetary
Board is dominated by government representatives acting on an ex-
officio basis.
5limits of existing laws. It should, however, be noted t_at the
two bodies are independent from each other. Thus, under this
setup, divergence in views and policy prescriptions could arise.
Laws always prevail. Under this ballgame, however,
Congress can change laws, while the Monetary Authorities/
Executive Branch are limited only to executing them. In
assessing the actions taken by the government with respect to
policy reforms in the financial sector, it is therefore necessary
to separate those that are initiated by the Monetary
Authorities/Executive Branch from those that emanate from
Congress.
A. Improvement of the Financial Structure
i. Actions Taken by the Monetary Authorities/Executive
Branch
The rash of bank failures in the wake of the balance-of-
payments crisis, despite massive Central Bank assistance,
prompted regulatory agencies to institute more measures to
prevent such failures and at the same time, strengthen the
banking system. Interestingly, most of the recently instituted
measures are designed to minimize mismanagement and insider
abuse. This is a tacit admission of the view that bank failures
were mainlycaused by fraud or insider abuse.
There were actually two types of measures that have been
instituted - one t_at could be done within existing laws and
another one that required changes in the charter, particularly
the Central Bank Act and the General Banking Act. As regards
the first set, the Central Bank effected some regulatory changes
through the issuance of circulars (See Table i). One of
the changes was the expansion of the coverage of the single
borrower's limit. In particular, the new regulation requires the
inclusion of contingent liabilities in the determination of the
limit to which banks can lend to a single borrower or a group of
affiliated borrowers. It also limits the amount of standby
letters of credit, both foreign and domestic, including
guarantees which require a third party to assume the obligation
in the event the borrower fails, and which can be issued by a
bank or a NBQB. The regulation limits such guarantees
outstanding at any given time to 50 percent of the bank's
unimpaired capital and surplus except guarantees that are fully
secured by cash, hold-out deposits, deposit substitutes or
government securities. The loan limit on single borrowers and
the ceiling on outstanding guarantees a bank can issue are
intended mainly to protect banks, particularly government banks,
which in the past had overextended funds principally to favored
groups. As part of its effort to closely monitor DOSRI loans,
the Central Bank requires the condition that the loan documents
include a waiver on the part of the depositor of his right under
Table 1
SUNNARYOFCHANGESIN CENTRhLBANKREGULATIONS,1986-1989
............................................................................................
Circu[ar No_ Effectivity Date Supervision/Control Deregulation
............................................................................................
1093 Feb. 26, 1986 Requiring RBstopost
within their premisea
copy of their quarterly
Statementof Condition.
11B4 May26, 1986 Reducingrequired reserve
from 23Xto 22Z against
KBs: demand eposits
savings deposit
NOWaccounts
time deposit (73B
daysor less)
deposit substitute
(73B daysor less)
Thrift banks: demand
deposits
depositsubstitute
(730daysor lessl
NBFIs:depositsubstitutes
(7_Bdaysor less)
1112 Aug. 4, i786 Reducingfurther the
required reserves from 22Z
Lo 21X for the same
accountsstated in
Circular iI_4
1113 Aug,14,1986 Prohibitingbankstore-
discountloansgrantedfrom
SpecialTimeDeposits(STD)
provided by the government
forthe8ulayansa
kaun]aranProgram.
7(Table i cont'd)
Circular No. Effectivity Date Supervision/Control Deregulation
............................................................................................
1114 Sept. 1, 1986 Setting the loan value of
8_Zandrediscountrateof
11.75_ p.a. for the redis-
count facility of the CB
foreligiblepapersin
agriculturalproduction,
cottageandsmallindustries
credits,generalpurpose
workingcapitalfinancing
andothershort-term
credits.
1115 Sept. 16, 1986 Prohibiting concurrent
officerships betweenbanks
or betweena bankanda non-
bankfinancialintermediary
except with prior approval
of the MonetaryBoard.
1119 Oct.Ii,198b Requiringallbankinginsti-
tutions,includingbankswith
expandedcommercialbanking
authoritytomaintaina 21Z
reserve against deposit
substituteliabilitieswith
originalmaturitiesof 73i
daysor less, exceptshort-
term borrowings from banks
andnon-bankfinancial
institutions for whichthe
reserve requirementshall be
1Z. A 6_ reserve against
deposit substitute liabili-
ties with original maturi-
ties of more than731 days for
NBQBsshallalsobe
maintained,
1122 Nov. 23, 1986 Reducingthe required
reserves for time deposits
from 6%to 5Z for all
banking institutions (i.e.,
KBs,Thrift banks,RBs)
andnon-bankfinancial
intermediaries. Likewise,
required reservesagainst
deposit substitute liabi-
lities withoriginal
maturities of morethan
730daysis reducedfrom
6_ to 5_.
8(Table 1 cont'd)
CircularNo. EffectivityDate Supervision/Control OereQulation
1123 Dec,5, 1986 Providesfortheinclusion
inthedeterminationofthe
singleborrower'sloanlimit
underSection23of R.A. 337
theoutstandingforeignand
domesticstandbyanddefer-
redletters of credit tess
marginaldepositsandout-
standingguarantees,xcept
thosefullysecuredbycash,
hold-outondeposits/deposit
substituteorgovernment
securities. Likewise,a99re-
9ate ceiling on issuanceof
guaranteesis provided
wherebye bankmaynot issue
morethan50%ofitsunim-
pairedcapitalandsurplus
standbylettersofcredit
foreignanddomestic,
includingguarantees,except
thosefullysecuredbycash,
hold-outondeposits/deposit
substitutesor government
securities. For NBQBs,it
mustnot exceed50Zof their
networth.
1124 Dec.5,1986 Requiringeachbanktocause
anannualfinancialudit o
beconductedbyanexternal
independentauditornotlater
than 30daysafter the close
of the calendaryearand
reportsof suchaudit shall
be submittedto the CBnot
later than90daysafter the
startoftheaudit..
1125 Dec.15, 1986 Reducingthe rediscount
rate to 10%p.a. from
11.76%p.a. as previously
providedinCircular1114
for the sameligible
papers.
9
(Table1 cont'd)
CircularNo, Effectivity Date Supervision/Contro] Oeregu]ation
1133 Feb.9, 1987 Exemptingfromlegal
reserverequirementspecial
time depositsanddeposit
substitutesarising from
the ]endingoperationsof
IGLFendALF.
1135 Feb.23, 1987 Requiringthe lendin9bank
to keepa completerecordof
al1 pertinentloandocuments
whichshall bemadeavailable
for inspectionand/or
examinationbythe CB.
1143 April 24, 1987 Settingthe guidelinesfor
the rehabilitation of rural
banksthrou9ha capital
build-upconsistingof a pre-
requisite freshcapital infu-
sionanda subsequentcon-
versionand/orplanof pay-
. meotof all arrearageswith
the CentralBankwhichare
pastdueandunpaidasof
Dec.31, 1986.
1147 Junet9, 1987 Prohibiting theaccountof
interest incomeof the loans
or loaninstallmentshave
maturedorhavebecomepast
due.Alsointerestincome
shall not beaccruedfor
unmaturedloans/receivables
withindications(i.e.bank-
ruptcy,insolvency,essation
ofoperations,orsuchother
conditionsof financial
difficultiestomeetfinan-
cialobligationsasthey
mature)thatcollectibility
hasbecomedoubtful.Accrued
interestearnedbutnotyet
collectedshallnotbeconsi-
deredasprofitsand/or
earningseligible for divi-
denddeclarationsand/or
profit sharingpurposes.
10
(Table 1 cont'd)
Circular No. Effectivity DaLe Supervision/Control Deregulation
1151 Aug. 27, 1987 Provides that ALF facility
maybe extendedto finance
both seasonalproduction
credit andmediumandlong-
term subloans for fixed
assets andpermanentworking
capital, except for the
acquisition of land. Likewise_
the interest rate on the
subsidiaryloansshall he
market oriented. Different
rates maybe providedfor
productionandlonger-term
credit.
1158 Oct. 5_ 1987 AmendingCircular 1143
regarding the fresh capital
infusion. In cases where
capital infusion exceedsthe
amountof PS_I,I_.OB_ the
excessmaybe paid into the
ruralbankbyitsstock-._.
holders and investors in
monthlyinstallment, provided
that the first installment
on the fresh capital
infusion shall not be less
thantheamountrequiredto
fullfil] the minimumllX risk
asset ratio. Participating
rural banksare not qualified
to avail of rediscounting
unless the required capital
infusion iscmmp,leted.
1166 Dec. 16, 1987 Requiringall banksand non-
bankfinancial intermediaries
to adoptthe Statementsof
Financial _ccounting
Standards(SFAS)in their
financial statementsand
r_ports to the CBwhich are
purported to be preparedin
accordancewithgenerally
acceptedaccounting
principles.
11
(TableI cant'd)
CircularNo. EffectivityDate Supervision/Control Deregulation
t172 March29, 1988 Withtheexceptionof rural
bankswhoseapplications
havealreadybeenapproved
underCircular1143,as
amendedbyCircular1158,
all ruralbankwith
arrearagesareeligibleto
participateunderthe
programexceptthosewith
seriousirregularities
basedonexamination
findingsoftheCB,Rural
bankswithsupervisedcre-
ditarrearageswherethe
,_requiredcapitalinfusion
exceedstheamountof
PSOO,OOO,the excessmaybe
coveredbytheRB's
availingitselfo the
conversionschemeprovided
thathealternativeshould
notbeconstruedasprem
ventingthestockholders,if
theysodesireforthe
interestoftheruralbank,
frominfusingmorethan
PSO0,OOO.A ruralbankmay
havetheoptionofsourcing
thepaymentsotheCBfrom
itscashresourcesprovided
suchoptionwillnot
reducetheliquidfunds
necessaryto meethe
depositreserverequire-
mentsandday-to-day
operationsf thebenk_
1183 Sept.15, 1988 Requiringbranches,agencies,
extensionoffices,etc,,and/
orheadofficesofcommercial
banks,andspecialized
governmentbanksina parti-'
cularegionalgroupingout-
sidetheNationalCapital
Regiontoinvestthereinas
a.meanstodevelopthat
region75%oftotaldeposit
liabilitiesandprovisions
for"tillmoney.""Deposits'
shallexclude:
12
(Table i cont'd)
Circular No. Effectivity Date Supervision/Control 8eregulation
(1) governmentdeposits sub-
ject to 75I liquidity
floor requireeent
(2) deposit of banks
maintained for clearing
purposesin areas ,here
there are no C8 clearin_
units
However,the twe|ve regional
groupingshavebeenreduced
to three enlargedgroupings
namelyLuzon,Visayasand
Mindanao.Theenlargedgroupings
shall be usedfor purposesof
determining the regional
retention of deposits.
This policy shall be deeied
coaplied with if, in a parti-
cular regionj the bank's
lending for the financing of
agricultura] andexport
industries aggregated6BZof
its deposits.
1188 Oct. 28, 1988 EIieinating the pre-requi-
site investeent in govern-
mentsecurities for
purposesof establishing/
openingbranchesandother
bankingoffices by banks.
1191 Nov. 23, 1968 Providesfor the forau]ation
andeonitoring of the "no,"
Banila ReferenceRates (RRRs)
which.i11 be basedonthe
.sighted averageof the
interest rates paid during
the il,ediately preceding
weekby II couercia] banks
with the highest c_bined
levels of outstandingdeposit
substitutes andti,e deposits
on promissorynotes issued
andtile deposits received
by these banks,of PJ|OtN!
andover per transaction
account, with eaturities
correspondingto the interest
periods for which such
13
(Table I cont'd)
Circular No. EffectivityDate Supervision/Control Deregulation
referenceratesare being
determined.
12|B May16, 1989 TheCBshall, therefore refrain
froa sustaining Neakbanksexcept
in times of general financial
eeergencyor whenspecific
banksface problemsof liqui-
dity rather than of solvency.
There is nobar to granting hem
licenses and, accordingly, the
establisheent of newbanksin
the future shall be allowed,
with the CBdeterminingthe
qualifications such as but not
limited to compliancewith all
requirementsof existing lens,
capitalization, direction and
administration as wellas the
integrity and responsibility
of the organizers and
adlinistrators.
TheCBhas lifted the require-
lent to purchasespecial five-
year governmentsecurities as a
condition to openneubranches.
In rural areasthat are
classified undercategories IV
andV, all restrictions on
openingnewbranchesare hereby
removed. In urbanandparticu-
larly eetropolitan areas, the
Central Bankshall obtain its
discretionary policy on
branching, but allom a bank to
openanem branchas long as
thebank'smarketsharein that
areaNouldnotcreateany
marketconcentrationproblems.
12|4 June 23, 1989 Raising the reserve requirement
ondeposit liabi|itiem and
deposit substitutes Nith
original maturities of more
than 731days from 5%to 7Z for
all financial institutionm
(i.e. [Bs, Thrift banks,and
rural banks)including non-bank
financial intermediaries.
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existing law of the confidentiality of his deposits in case the
same depositor obtained a loan secured by hold-outs or
assignments of deposits.
To make all transactions of banks more transparent and
reduce wholesale bank anomalies, the Central Bank has required
all banks, whether government-owned or controlled or private, to
be subject to an annual financial audit by independent auditors.
The board of directors of concerned banks, in a regular or
special meeting, shall consider and act on the financial audit
report and shall submit, within 30 days after receipt of the
report, a copy of its resolution to the Central Bank. The
resolution shall show, among others, actions taken by the board
of directors on the findings and recommendations of the
independent auditor. To further facilitate its job in
supervising banks, the Monetary Board has required the lending
banks to keep a complete record of all pertinent loan documents
which shall be made available for inspection and/or examination
by the Central Bank. In another circular, the Monetary Board has
decided to prohibit concurrent officerships between banks or
between a bank and a non-bank financial intermediary except with
prior approval from the Board. This is one of the measures taken
to reduce conflict of interest and also to strengthen bank
management since being a bank officer requires a full-time job.
The latest Central Bank circular dated May 16, 1989 spells
out its policy towards improving the stability and soundness of
the banking system. More specifically, it shall refrain from
sustaining weak banks except in times of general financial
emergency or when specific banks face problems of liquidity
rather than of solvency. This is in sharp contrast to the policy
followed during the 1981 liquidity crisis that led to the
government takeover of weak banks.
As regards regulatory changes that required amendment of
certain provisions of the Central Banking Act and General Banking
Act; the Central Bank wasted no time in submitting proposals to
this effect to the new government under the leadership of
President Aquino who could have acted on all or a number of them
before the newly-reconstituted Congress would have convened. It
proposed 17 major amendments to the Central Bank Act which
included among others, making the powers of supervision of the
Central Bank effective in preventing and penalizing the
commission of irregularities and fraud through the
instrumentalities of banks; clarifying the roles of the receiver
and liquidator and their powers and privileges; imposing stiffer
penalties for submitting false statements and violation of laws
and regulations; and prohibiting banks with outstanding emergency
advances from the Central Bank from expanding the total volume of
its loans or investments or granting new loans or renewals of
existing loans. However, of the 17 proposed amendments,
President Aquino acted only on two of them - one pertaining to
the role and powers of the receiver and liquidator and the other
15
one, on interbank settlements. As regards interbank settlements,
an Executive Order signed by President Aquino intends to curb
abuses usually practised by banks, especially the weaker ones.
In particul_r, the new law provides that the Central Bank will
not clear checks drawn against the bank's accounts to settle its
interbank balances if it continues to overdraw for five
consecutive days and fails to fully cover the overdrafts. Banks
with existing overdrafts with the Central Bank should either
convert these into an emergency loan or advance with a plan of
payment, or settle said overdrafts with the Central Bank.
The Central Bank also submitted to President Aquino for her
approval 14 major proposed amendments to the General Banking Act.
Most of the proposed amendments have focused on curbing insider
abuse. For instance, it has been s_ggested that additional
requisites in the processing of loans be imposed to minimize, if
not actually prevent, the grant of bank _ loans without proper
documents. This would stop banks' previous practice of approving
DOSRI loan applications even if the documentation is incomplete.
Another proposed amendment being advanced is to authorize the
Monetary Board to prescribe the conditions and limitations under
which DOSRI loans can be granted by banks. Heavier penalties for
violation of any provision of the General Banking Act were also
proposed. to deter bank irregularities and fraud. Another
important proposed amendment is the empowering of the Central
Bank to issue "cease and desist" order. This is an additional
regulatory and enforcement instrument of the Central Bank.
However, not one of the 14 proposed amendments to the General
Banking Act was acted upon by President Aguino. Thus, the burden
of overhauling the Central Bank Act and the General Banking Act
now rests with the Congress.
The World Bank Mission which visited the country last year
has picked up most of the Central Bank-initiated proposed
amendments to the Central Bane Act and General BanKing Act and
has incorporated them in the set of conditions attached to the
Financial Sector Adjustment Loan.
While measures to improve the stability of the financial
system through a more effective system of bank supervision have
been instituted, some measures have also been adopted to enhance
competition in the system. One of the measures was the
relaxation of the deposit retention scheme. Previously, bane
branches were required to invest 75 percent of the total deposit
liabilities in their limited service area designated by the
Central Bank. The new measure has expanded the definition of
service area into only three major island groupings: Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. 5/ In addition, the Monetary Board has
significantly reduced barriers to entry. More specifically, it
s/
See Circular 1183 on page ii.
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has terminated its moratorium of giving new bank licenses,
eliminated the prerequisite investment in government securities
for purposes of establishing/opening branches and other banking
offices by banks, and has allowed entry into all areas in the
country, except in certain areas of the urban centers perceived
by the Central Bank as "overbanked." 6_/
The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) has been
playing a passive role in the financial system. Its function is
merely relegated to paying insured deposits of failed banks and
occasionally, helping package a rehabilitation scheme for
troubled banks. It has been perceived to be a mere adjunct of
the Central Bank. This is not without reason. First, one of
the deputy governors of the Central bank was the President of
PDIC. And secondly, due to lack of funds, PDIC depends heavily
on borrowings from the Central Bank to pay insured deposits of
failed banks.
There is now a plan to make PDIC play an active role in the
financial system. One major step so far taken by authorities was
to appoint a full-time president who came from the private
sector. Other plans for PDIC include increasing its capital and
personnel complement and making it the receiver and liquidator of
failed banks, thereby allowing the Central Bank to concentrate
its efforts on bank supervision and management of liquidity.
As regards PNB and DBP, the government has opted for their
rehabilitation. The first task that was done was to revise their
respective charters. The second task was to transfer non-
performing assets of these two institutions to the National
Government which created the Asset Privatization Trust that takes
care of disposing such assets. In 1986, DBP transferred to the
National Government its non-performing assets amounting to
_61.4 B and certain liabilities and related accounts amounting to
@62.2 B. This resulted in the drastic reduction in DBP's total
assets to @9.5 B in 1986 from a high @72 B in 1985. Recently,
DBP has changed its lending procedure to make itself resistant to
behest loans. This is done by including regional bank
authorities in the process of making decision on loan requests.
Under its new charter, the authorized capital of PNB has
been reduced from @25 B to _10 B. In 1986, PNB transferred to
the National Government P47 B worth of non-performing assets and
@55.4 B worth of liabilities. In addition, it had written off
@5.2 B and booked @0.9 B as additional valuation reserve. With
the rehabilitation program, PNB's total assets were substantially
6/
The adverse impact of the previous regulation on deposit
retention scheme and bank entry on the efficiency of the banking
system is thoroughly discussed in Lamberte and Lim (1987) and
Relampagos and Lamberte (1988).
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reduced to @27 B in 1986 from @76 B in 1985. Starting on June
30, 1989, PNB no longer receives special treatment from the
Central Bank beyond the normal rediscounting facility available
to all commercial banks.
2. Actions Taken by the Legislative Branch
In response to the Constitutional provisions of creating a
truly independent Central Monetary Authority, two separate bills
have been filed in Congress (See Tables 2a and 2b). The House
version introduces some amendments to the present Central Bank
Act while the Senate version proposes an entirely new charter for
the Central Bank. Both bills focus on the membership of the
Monetary Board majority of which are supposed to come from the
private sector and on strengthening the supervisory function of
the proposed Central Monetary Authorities. A third bill simply
proposes the decentralization of the country's Central Banking
Authority, responsibilities and facilities on a regional basis.
This is akin to the system in the US.
Concerned with the previous practice of using government to
distribute political patronage and rampant insider abuse that
caused several banks to fail, a bill filed in the House proposes
to prescribe limits on Loans or accommodations which government
banks and other financial institutions may grant to borrowers.
The proposed ceilings are substantially lower than the existing
ones.
The PDIC has received much attention from lawmakers judging
from the number of bills seeking to amend its present charter.
The ma3or provisions of the bills include, among others,
increasing the permanent insurance fund, assessment rate, and
maximum deposit insurance coverage; expanding the coverage of
assessable deposits; requiring prompt payment of insured
deposits; and increasing the participation of the private sector
by including three representatives in the five-man board of
directors of PDIC.
Increasing the maximum deposit insurance coverage from
_40,000 per depositor to @60,000 or @80,000 or equivalent to full
value of deposits may bring very little benefits to small
depositors. AS may be shown in Table 3, 96 percent of the total
number of deposit accounts of the banking system are already
covered by the existing maximum insurance coverage. However,
increasing the insurance fund of PDIC may bring more benefits to
all depositors, especially to small ones because it would enable
PDIC to promptly pay insured deposits of failed banks. As may be
qathered from Table 4, PDIC was still paying in 1987 insured
deposits of closed banks in earlier years. Interestingly, one
of the bills proposes to deny PDIC of receivership and
liquidation power. This is inconsistent with the current plan of
the government to transfer the receivership and liquidation power
of the Central Bank to PDIC.
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Table 2a
SENATE BILLS RELATED TO BANKING AND CREDIT POLICIES
(As of April 1989)
No. Authors Brief Description
Unnumbered Aquino "An Act to Promote Financial Interme-
diation in the Agricultural and Rural
Areas"
- exempt from purchasing any
government securities whatsoever.
- unrestricted entry.
- at least 80% of the funds genera-
ted shall be retained in the rural
areas.
- Allowed to invest or lend not more
than 15% of its net worth.
- the total amount of equity invest-
ments shall not exceed fifty per-
cent of its net worth.
- exempt from the gross receipts tax
and from the EO No. 37 imposing a
twenty percent withholding tax on
interest income.
- free from Central Bank imposed
interest rates on loans, deposits,
deposit substitutes and trust
funds.
- market determined interest rates
on loans, deposits, and trust
funds.
19 Romulo "An Act Providing for Credit Assist,
and ante For Overseas Workers"
Herrera
- provides interest-free fund advan-
ces to be repaid via monthly
wage/salary deduction.
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No. Authors Brief Description
159 Alvarez "An Act Creating the Cooperative
Development Authority to Promote the
ViaDility and Growth of Cooperatives
as Instruments of Social Justice and
Economic Development, Defining its
Powers, Functlons and Responsiblli-
ties, Rationalizing Government Agen-
cies with Cooperative Functions,
Transferring the Registration and
Regulation Functlons of Existing
Government Agencies on Cooperatives
as Such and Consolidating the Same
with the _uthority, Appropriating
Funds therefor, and for Other
Purposes."
171 Alvarez "An Act Providing for Credit to
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries through
the Banking System and the Mechanism
and Incentives thereto"
- provides that all DanKing institu-
tions shall set aside at least 25%
of their loanaOle funds for agri-
cultural credit to be distributed
as follows:
a) 15% of loanable funds for agri-
cultural credit in general; and
D) 10% of loanable funds for agra-
rian reform beneficiaries
(ARBs)
c) alternatively, to invest these
funds in certain government
securities.
- loans granted directly to ARBs to
De credited at two hundred percent
(20_%)
- exemption of interest, income on
loans to ARBs from Gross Receipts
Tax (GRT).
- losses on loans to ARBS deductible
up to one hundred fifty percent
(150%).
2O
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202 Mercado "An Act to Provide Maximum Rates of
Interest to Loans Up to the Amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos"
- Progressive interest rate for pure
and simple loan_ up to the amount
of _10,000.00.
- Maximum rates of interest for
simple, personal loans:
a) 1.50% per month if the sum lent
does not exceed _2,000.00.
b) 1.75% per month if the sum lent
does not exceed _4,000.00
c) 2.00% per month if the sum lent
does not exceed _6,000.00.
d) 2.25% per month if the sum lent
does not exceed _8,000.00
e) 2.50% per month if the sum lent
does not exceed _10,000.0@.
268 Maceda "An Act Amendlng Presidential Decree
Numbered One Hundred Fourteen by
Revising and Incorporating therein
the Rates of Interest and other
Charges Collected by Pawnshops and
for other Purposes"
- Pegged interest rate at three (3)
percent per month when the sum
lent is not more than one hundred
pesos; two and one-half (2 1/2)
percent per month when the sum
lent is more than one hundred
pesos but not exceeding five
hundred pesos; two (2) percent per
month when the sum lent is not
exceeding one thousand pesos; and
fourteen (14) percent per annum
when it is more than one thousand
pesos.
(150%).
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- No interest shall be collected at
any time before maturity, if said
loans is only of three months
duration or less. Advance
interest payments may be required
on loans with a period of more
than three months provided that no
collection shall be made on the
first three months and that only
interest for a total period of six
months may be collected in
advance.
- A service charge of _5 for loans
not exceeding five hundred pesos
or a maximum of one (i) percent of
the principal loans if exceeding
that amount.
- Loans not more than three thousand
five hundred (_3,500.00) pesos are
free from documentary stamp tax.
- The basis of interest due after
maturity shall be the sum of the
principal of the obligation, and
interest earned at t_e time of
maturity.
368 Romulo "An Act Repealing Sections 220, 221,
and and 222, under Title VIII, of the
Guingona National Internal Revenue Code of
1977, as Amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1739 and further Amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1994"
- abolition of the Gross Receipts
Tax imposed on interest incomes of
banks.
614 Romulo "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree
Numbered Seven Hundred Seventeen as
Amended "Providing an Agrarian Reform
Credit and Financing System to Agra-
rian Reform Beneficiaries through
Banking Institutions' "
m
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- abolishing the 25% agri/agra loan
quota.
681 Maceda "An Act Directlng the Monetary Board
or the Central Monetary Authority, as
the Case might Be, to Program and
Eventually Implement the Appropriate
Decentralization of the Country's
Central Ban_ing Authority, Responsi-
bilities and Facilities, on a Region-
al Basis Commencing Initially with
Full Central Banking CapaOility
Respectively for Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao"
743 Shanani, "Magna Carta for Small Enterprises"
Laurel,
Mercado - Collateral-free or less collate-
and rally burdened loans for small
Pimentel enterprises
- Preferential interest rates on
loans ootained under the credit
program.
- Exemptions from import taxes, fees
or duties on imported machineries
or equipment.
- A fair share of at least 15% of
total procurement value of goods
and services supplied to the
government
880 Romulo "An Act Strengthening the Rural
and Financial System of the Philippines,
Alvarez Designatlng the Land Bank of the
Philippines as the Apex Bank and
Providing t_e Funds therefore, and
for other Purposes"
- 60% of the amount representing the
fresh gove-nment equity infusion
shall De used fo_ agricultural
loans and 40% of it for other
countryside entities.
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- Banks should maintain a risk-asset
ratio of not less than ten percent
(10%) after infusion
- Members of the rural financial
system are exempted from payment
of the Gross Receipts Tax while
rural banks shall be exempted from
the payment of all taxes and fees
for a period of 15 years from tne
approval of this account.
- LBP shall have equity interest of
up to 49% in these Regional Agri-
cultural Banks.
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TaDle 2b
HOUSE BILLS RELATED TO BANKING AND CREDIT POLICIES
No. Autnor/s Brief Description
2 Puyat-Reyes, "An Act to Amend Republic Act No.
Coseteng, Verano- 3591, otherwise known as The Philip-
Yap, Aquino-Oreta, pine Deposit Insurance Corporation
Isidro, Lopez, Act, as Repealed further by Republic
Fugoso, Bagatsing Act No. 6037, and Amended by Presi-
(A.), Bagatsing dential Decree Nos. 120, 653, 1094,
(R.), Ocampo, Yap, 1451, 1897, 1940_ 1985 and Executive
Aquino, Mathay, Order No. 890,and for o_ner Purposes"
Jr., Angeles, Webb,
Javier, Tinga, - Maximum assessment rate is
Zamora, Serapio, increased to 1/5 of one (i) per-
Aguilar, and Dragon cent per annum.
- Coverage of assessable deposits is
expanded to include the liabili-
tles of the bank for cashier's,
manager's and other officer's
checks, demand drafts, telegraphic
transfers, and other payment
orders payable.
- The assessment rate will be
applied to the gross assessment
base without any deductions.
- Interest shall be cnarged on all
unpaid assessments.
- Receivership and liquidation power
of PDIC is abolished.
- The permanent insurance fund is
increased to _5 billion.
- Interest rates on PDIC loans from
the CB is the prevailing redis-
count rate or at similar rate as
may De determined by the CB.
239 Real, Jr. and "An Act Requiring Prompt Payment of
Gonzales Insured Deposits of Closed Banks, and
Amending for this Purpose Section 10
(c) of Republic Act No. 3591, other-
wise Known as the Charter of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion, as Amended"
2S
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- Appropriates _5,00_,000 from the
General Fund as permanent
insurance fund.
- Maximum amount of the insured
deposit of any depositor shall be
_40,000.
- In case of closure on account of
insolvency, the corporation snail
extend payment of the insured
deposit, within a period of thirty
days, either by cash or by making
availaDle to each depositor a
transferred deposit in another
insured bank in an amount equal to
the insured deposlt.
325 Romualdo, Pilapil, "An Act EstaDlishing the Government
Romero, Camasura, MacHinery to Promote the Growth and
Jr., Unico, del Mar, Expansion of Cooperatives as The
Garcia (p.), Ozamis, People's Organizations for Creating,
Amante, Amatong, Sustaining and Increasing their Eco-
Chavez, Pelaez, nomic Opportunities, otherwise Known
Tevez, Agana, as The Cooperative Law of 1987"
LaDaria, Almario,
LoDregat and Puyat- - Exemption from all government
Reyes taxes, duties, levies and fees of
wnatever name and nature,
- Exemption from payment of income,
sales and lending investors tax,
- Exemption from the payment of fees
and charges for services in
connection with any document or
paper required in the
organization.
- Exemption from the payment of fees
for services of a register of
deeds in connection with any deed
of sale, conveyance, transfer, or
exchange of real property or any
deed or instrument in connection
wit_ any loan.
- Exemption for tne payment of all
court andsheriffs' fees
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- Exemption from the payment of
documentary stamp tax, residence
tax, and taxes on banks and
insurance companies
- Preferential right to supply
agricultural and marine products
to state agencies.
- In appropriate cases, exemption
from the application of the
minimum wage law.
1291 Real, Jr., "An Act Prescribing limits on Loans
Cainglet, Pandon, or Accommodations which Government
Jr., Agana, Banks and other Financial Institu-
Valencia, tions may Grant to BOrrowers"
Bagatsing, Jr.
Garduce, Amatong, - Limits financial accomodations to
Andolana, Monfort an amount not exceeding 5% of
lender's net worth and not exceed-
ing 100% of the borrower's net-
worth.
1524 Real Jr., Dureza, "An Act Converting all Past Due Loans
Cainglet, Montejo, of Rural Banks with the Central Bank
Amatong, Plaza, of the Philippines into Government
Bacunawa, Agana, Equity and for other Purposes."
Garduce, Alfelor,
Dragon
1676 Bautista "An Act Requiring all Government and
Private Banks to Set Aside at Least
One Percentum (1%) of their Yearly
Liquid Assets to Help Finance the
Pro3ects and Livelihood Program of
Fisheries all over the Country
Utilizing the Local Banks to Service
Said Financing"
1724 Bautista "An Act Directing all Government and
Private Banks to Set Aside at Least
One Percentum (1%) of their Yearly
Loanable Funds Exclus_ively for Fund-
ing the Drivers all over the
Country."
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1808 Bautista "An Act Establishing a Farmers and
Fishermen Bank in every Municipality
Throughout the Country, and Providing
Funds therefor."
- A minimum authorized capital of
_500,000.
2578 Bautlsta, St., Del "An Act Directing the Central Bank of
Mar and Monfort the Philippines to Provide Specific
Lending Guidelines to Help Consumers
and Marketing Cooperatives, and
Appropriating Funds thereof as Seed
Capital"
- Approprlated One Billion Pesos
(_1,000,000,000) as "Seed Money"
for lending.
2943 Ty and Monfort "An Act further Amending Republic Act
Numbered 3591 entitled "An Act Estab-
lishing the Philippine Deposit Insu-
rance Corporation Defining its Powers
and Duties and for other Purposes',
as Amended"
- Increases the maximum deposit
insurance coverage in the banking
system from _40,000 to _80,000.
- The assessment rate shall not
exceed one-tenth of one per centum
per annum.
- The permanent insurance fund is
further increased to three billion
(_3,000,000,000) pesos.
7640 Real, Jr., Puyat- "An Act further Amending Republic Act
Reyes, Ty, the Number Three Thousand Five Hundred
members of the Ninety One, otherwise Known as the
Committee on Banks Charter of the Philippine Deposit
and Currency, Insurance Corporation, as Amended,
Coseteng, Verano- and for other Purposes"
Yap, Aquino-Oreta,
Isldro, Lopez (J.),
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Fugoso, Bagatsing
(A.), Bagatsing
(R.), Ocampo, Yap
(R.), Aquino (A.),
Mathay, Jr.,
Angeles (D.), Webb,
Javier (R.), Tinga,
Zamora, Serapio,
Aguilar, Dragon,
Gonzales and
Monfort
9126 Javier (E.) and "An Act Amending Republic Act No. 265
Bagatsing, Jr. as Amended to Establish the Central
Monetary Authority, Defining Its
Role, Responsibilities, Objectives
and Powers in the Administration of
the Monetary, Credit and Banking
System and for other Purposes"
10787 Romualdo, Teves, "An Act to Promote the Growth and
Dayanghirangi Development of Cooperatives as Ins-
Andaya, Pilapil, trument for National Development and
Romero, Camasura, Creating the Cooperatives Development
Jr., Unico, del Commission to Coordinate and Ration-
Mar, Garcia (P.), alize all Government Pollcies and
Ozamis, Amante, Agencies Supporting Cooperatives Dev-
Amatong, Chavez,De elopment, Appropriating Funds there-
Pedro III, Pelaez, for and for other Purposes"
Del Rosario,
Dominguez, De
venecia, Jr.,
Cojuangco, Jr.,
Sarmiento, St.,
Laguda, Bagatsing,
Jr., Mercado
(R.M.), Concepcion,
Jr., Monfort,
Nu_ez, Lingad,
Durano III,
Espinosa (M),
Sison, de Guzman,
Jr., Javier (E.),
Joson, Jr., Veloso,
Payumo, Estrella,
Jr., Tuzon,
Escudero Ill,
Bandon, Jr., Orbos,
Martinez, Jr.,
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.v
CeriIles, Mastura,
Tinga, Rivera, Jr.,
ADines, Agana,
LaDaria, Almario,
Lobregat, Puyat-
Reyes, Roa, and the
Members of the
Committee on
Economic Affairs,
Committee on
Government
Reorganization and
Committee on
Appropriations
16926 Orbos "An Act Exempting from Taxes the
Receipts And Income of Loans Used to
Finance Agriculturally Based, Related
and/or Located Activities and
Businesses"
- Receipts and income of loans shall
be exempted from all taxes, inclu-
ding gross receipts tax and income
tax.
16927 Orbos "An Act Exempting the Interest Income
of Certain Types of Deposits from
Tax"
- Exempted are the following: a)
income of deposits with rural
banks, private development banks,
savings banks, savings and loans
associations whose main office and
principal operatives are or are
not located in the countryside; b)
income of deposits of commercial
banks and savings banks with rural
banks, private development banks
and loan associations, whose main
offices and principal operations
are located in the countryslde.
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17848 Orbos, Adaza, "Magna Carta for Small Enterprises"
Dragon, Pardon,
Joaquin, Aquino, - Exempted from all Kinds of taxes ;
Florante, Jaime,
Lopez, Guanzon, - Exclusion of any and all income
Laguda, Puey, receipts from the computation of
Lacson, Yulo, the individual income tax;
Aoines, Garcia
(P.), Martinez, - In lleu of all taxes and other
Durano, dela Serna, business taxes, CBEs shall pay a
Del Mar, Paras, yearly CBE tax to the municipality
Romero, Teves, or city where they are registered.
Monte3o, Dorca,
Velozo, Locsin,
Loreto, Mercado
(R.G.), Daza, Ong,
Ro_o, Garduce,
Ramirez, Dauz, Tan,
et.al.
19782 Tinga, Paras, Yap "An Act to Develop the Philippine
(R), Garcia (E.), Securities Market, Create a Capital
Bengson (III), Market Development Commission, Define
Zarraga, Bagatsing, its Powers and Duties, Amend Perti-
Jr., Tan3uatco , nent Provisions of Relevant Laws, and
Lopez (J.), for other Purposes"
Sarmiento, St.,
Dragon, Aquino The following are incentives given to
(H.S.), Aquino listed corporations:
(A.), Bagatsing
(A.), and Monfort - Tax deductible dividend payments
- Exemption from documentary stamp
tax on every original issue of
certificate of stocks
- Reduced income tax to 30% of any
closedcorporation which converts
into listed corporatlon
- Free listing of long-term debt
securities or instruments
- Documentary stamp tax on long-term
securities or instruments is
reduced to fifty centavos (50_)
for each two hundred pesos or
fraction thereof, of their face
value
31
NO. Author/s Brief Description
- The above incentives are subject
to the following conditions:
a) any corporation shall list
unissued snares representing at
least thirty-three and one-
thirds percent (33-1/3%) of its
voting stock in any securities
exchange.
b) the aggregate par value of the
listed shares shall not be less
than ten million pesos
(_10,000,000) or such larger
amount as may De fixed by the
Commission from time to time.
c) any such corporation shall lose
all the shares representing its
authorized capital stock within
a period of fore (5) years from
the date of its initial listing
application.
The following are incentives given to
investors:
- Tax deductible investments equal-
ling the full amount invested in
original issues of snares of
listed corporations provided that
it shall not in any one year
exceed five percent (5%) of the
investor's net income before the
investments for that year, or ten
percent if the investments are in
snares of listed corporations in
less developed areas.
- Exemption from documentary stamp
tax on sales of listed shares and
other securities
- Exemption from documentary stamp
tax of original issue of certifi-
cates of stock.
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- Indirect income from listed debt
securities shall be subject to the
following rates of wifholding
taxes:
a) twenty percent (20%), if the
security has a maturity of one
(i) year or less;
D) fifteen percent (15%), if the
security has a maturity exceed-
ing one year but less than five
(5) years;
c) ten percent (10%), if the secu-
rity has a maturity of five
years or longer but-less than
seven (7) years;
d) five percent (5%), if the secu-
rity has a maturity of seven
years or longer but less than
ten (10) years; and
e) no tax, if the security has a
maturity of _en (10) years or
longer.
21063 Calingasan "An Act Increasing the Amount of
Insured Deposits to Eighty Percent
(80%) of the Total Deposits of Each
Depositor Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act Numbered Tnfrty Five
Hundred and Ninety-One, as Amended,
Entitled "An ACt Establishing the
Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Defining its Powers and
Duties and for other Purposes'"
- Provides twenty-million pesos for
the permanent insurance fund, the
amount of fifteen million pesos is
appropriated from the General
Fund.
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22354 Bagatsing "An Act Exempting Interests Derived
from Philippine Currency Ban_
Deposits from being Taxed Amending
for the Purpose Section 2, Paragraph
(c) of Executive Order No. 37, in
Relation to Section 21, Paragraph (d)
of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as Amended"
22362 Ty and "An Act Revising Our Monetary System
Labaria by Phasing out the Present Currency
from Circulation and Replacing it
with Currency which has Gold and/or
Silver Reserve for other Purposes"
- Transfers monetary policies from
the control of the Central Bank of
the Philippines to the Treasury of
the Philippines.
24375 Javier "An Act Providing that Insurace
Coverage of Bank Deposits of an Indi-
vidual Depositor be the Total Amount
of his Deposits Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act Numbered Thirty-
Five Hundred and Ninety-ONe, as
Amended, Entitled "An Act Establish-
ing the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Defining the Powers and
Duties and for other Purposes'"
- Provides five billion pesos for
the permanent insurance fund, the
amount of three billion pesos is
appropriated from the General
Fund.
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Table 3
PDICRISKEXPOSUREON DEPOSITLIABILITIESOF THEPHILIPPINEBANKIN@SYSTEN
As of September31,1987
........................................................................... . ....... .------. ....
NO.OF NUMBEROFACCOUNTS PERCENTOFACCOUNTS
BANKINB....................................................
OFFICES1/ Up to Over Up to Over
Total P40,100 P40,80B P40,|H P4|_Ut
....................................................................... ------.. ........... . ....
21
CommercialBanks 31 10,730,334 1B,163,822 567,312 94.71 5.29
SavingsBanks 7 1,660,04e 1,627,427 32,613 98.84 1.96
DevelopmentBanks(DBs):
Private BBs 42 707,887 697,@92 IB,195 98.5& 1.44
DevelopmentBank 1 86,509 85,065 1,444 98.33 1.67
of the Philippines(DBP)
StockSavings& 63 2,041,198 2,031,6B6 9,592 99.53 0.47
LoansAssn.(SLAm) 4/
RuralBanks 585 2,787,5&6 2,776,685 10,961 99.61 0.39
TOTAL 649 18,013_53417,301,417632,117 96.49 3.51
BEPOSITS(Inmillionsof pesos)
PERCENTOF
INSUREDEPOSITS UNINSUREDDEPOSITS3/
Total Total Up to Over DEPOSITS Un-
Deposits Insured P40,000P4B,BO0 InsuredInsured
CommercialBanks 163,976 49,539 26,847 22,692 114,437 30.21 69.79
SavingsBanks 7,187 4,579 3,274 1,305 2,688 61.71 36.29
DevelopmentBanks:
Private DBs 2,280 1,342 934 408 938 58.86 41.15
DBP 636 184 126 58 452 28.93 71.11
StockSLAs 2,639 1,838 1,454 384 Bgl 69.65 30.34
RuralBanks 3,B16 2,4B9 1,770 439 617 79.87 20.13
TOTAL 179,754 57,891 34,685 25,2B6 119,843 33.32 66.60
II
Headoffices only.
2/
Includestwospecialgovernmentbanks(LandBankof thePhilippinesandPhilippine
AmanahBank),
3/
Percentageswerecomputedbefore rounding.
4/
Reporting rural banksonly.
Source: PDIC1987AnnualReport.
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Table 4
PAYMENTS MADE BY PDIC IN 1987
No. of Amount Paid
Accounts (P M)
25 Banks closed in 1984 and prior years 4,703 11.38
42 Banks closed in 1985 26,822 64.29
22 Banks closed in 1986 7,570 16.80
2 Banks closed in 1987 117,006 549.52
91 Banks Serviced 156,101 641.99
Source: PDIC 1987 Annual Report.
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B. Improvement of the Rural Credit Market
One of the major drawbacks in the government's effort to
implement a full rural development policy is the underdeveloped
rural financial markets. This may be seen from the inability o_
big formal financial institutions to provide a more sustained
flow of credit for agriculture-based economic activities. With
the thrust of the present government to pursue a rural-based,
export-led development strategy, rural financial institutions
will therefore play an increasing role in meeting this challenge.
There is a problem, however, of creating a truly viable
rural financial market that will complement the government's
efforts in effecting rural development. The present trend of
less active involvement among bigger financial institutions in
rural finance leaves rural banks as the only active participants
in the formal rural credit market. In the long run, this trend
must be corrected in order for the rural financial market to
meet the growing financial requirements of a rural sector in
progress. But in the immediate term, there is a need to
strengthen the rural banking system being the most important
channel of formal credit to small enterprises in the rural areas.
This section reviews banking policies instituted by the
Monetary Board/Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch that
directlybear on the improvement of the rural financial markets.
Specifically, policies on rural bank rehabilitation, deposit
retention scheme, and free entry of banks will be emphasized.
i. Rural Bank Rehabilitation
Actions Taken by the Monetary Board
Past policies had induced rNral banks to become mere
conduits of government-supported credit programs designed to
boost economic activities in the rural sector. There was a
failure to emphasize the need to mobilize deposits for their
lending operations. Rural banks became increasingly more
dependent on the rediscounting window which in effect, led to the
accumulation of over @2 B arrearages with the Central Bank as of
December 1986. When massive farmer-borrower defaults occurred
during the 1983-84 economic crisis, a significant number of rural
banks discontinued their operations and many experienced
deteriorating financial conditions. The sad plight of the rural
banking system handicapped the operations of small production
units which do not haveaccess to bigger banks, and would
therefore place a severe strain on the government's effort to
stimulate rural development.
In response, the present administration implemented the
rural bank rehabilitation program through CB Circular 1143 issued
in 1987. This is not the first time that the rural banking
system has undergone a rehabilitation program. During the
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previous regime, the rural banking system underwent at least two
massive rehabilitation programs. But unlike the previous
regime's programs, the current rehabilitation program emphasizes
the need t_ strengthen the financial viability of rural banks
through the latter's own initiative. Specifically, the present
program aims to strengthen the rural banking system through a
capital build-up and conversion scheme and/or plan of payment for
rural banks experiencing financial difficulty. The latter
provides for the conversion of arrearages into paid-in capital of
the government in the form of shares of stock of a rural bank
issued in the name of the Land Bank of the Philippines in the
case of a conversion scheme. But in the case of a plan of
payment, a rural bank shall enter into an arrangement with the
Central Bank involving the amortization of arrearages within a
period of not exceeding 10 years. As contained in the original
program, a prerequisite to the approval of application in the
program is a requirement for the private _ stockholders to infuse
into the rural bank fresh capital in cash equal to at least 10
percent of supervised credit arrearages with the Central Bank
including accrued interest but excluding penalties, or an amount
equal to the deficiency in capital of the bank required to
achieve the 10 percent minimum risk asset ratio, whichever is
higher.
Many rural banks expressed willingness to reopen and
continue their operation, but only a few have been able to
qualify in the program. Some stockholders find it difficult to
comply with the fresh capital infusion requirement considering
that only existing owners (i.e., family groups) are willing to
infuse more capital in a rural bank. Though rural bankers
acknowledge the risk involved in allowing one family to control a
bank, they still find it the most practical way to build up
capitalization during the rehabilitation period.
The developments taking place in the rehabilitation of rural
banks prompted the Monetary Board to amend the fresh capital
requirement portion to include an alternative mode of payment for
rural bank capitalization. As contained in the revised program
through Central Bank Circular 1158, stockholders have the option
of paying into the rural bank in monthly installments within a
period not exceeding six months the amount in excess of @500,000
fresh capital infusion. However, rural bankers seek further
reduction in the fresh capital infusion from @500,000 to
@300,000.
Many rural bankers perceive that the program primarily aims
to make rural banks, especially those with bigger loan
arrearages, settle their accounts with the Central Bank.
Considering that a bigger portion of the rural banks' arrearages
with the Central Bank is due to borrower loan defaults, most of
them are seeking further refinements of the program to include
condonation of accrued interest, liquidated damages and other
charges on such loan arrearages. Rural banks are willing to pay
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the principal given enough time, but condonation of accrued
interest which is supposed to be collected from borrowers who
have defaulted would speed up their rehabilitation.
To improve the participation rate among rural banks, the
program was further revised. Under the revised program contained
in Central Bank Circular 1172, all rural banks with arrearages
with the Central Bank which are past due and unpaid as of
December 31, 1986 are qualified to join (except those with
serious irregularities and those whose applications have been
approved Under the original program contained in Central Bank
Circular 1143 and 1158). These arrearages also include emergency
loans, overdue special time deposits and CB-IBRD accounts.
Actions Taken by the Legislative Branch
There are several bills being filed in Congress seeking to
improve financial intermediation in the rural sector (See Tables
2a and 2b). One particular point related to rural bank
rehabilitation is a Senate bill exempting rural banks from the
payment of all taxes and fees for a period of 15 years. This is
in line with the Legislative Branch's efforts to strengthen the
rural financial system by, among others, exempting rural
financial institutions from payment of the gross receipts tax.
This move could be one of the steps to improve the financial
status of rural banks during the rehabilitation period but may be
open to abuses of non-payment of other obligations with the
Central Bank not covered by thisparticular bill. Exempting banks
from all taxes is certainly a significant policy reversal.
Another bill seeks to convert all past due loans of rural
banks with the Central Bank into government equity to be held by
the Land Bank of the Philippines in the form of preferred stocks.
This is inconsistent with the rural bank rehabilitation program
currently implemented by the Central Bank. The financial sector
reform program calls for a reduction in government involvement in
the operations of the financial system and greater participation
of bank owners in rehabilitating their banks. The same bill
proposes that rural banks shall devote 50 percent of their
loanable funds for lending to small farmers, fishermen and other
land reform beneficiaries, but enjoins the Central Bank to open
its rediscounting window to rural banks. The bill, however, does
not specify the mode of rediscounting for rural banks. This is a
retrogression to the past policies on rural bank lending
operations and could run counter to the rehabilitation program as
rural banks would become dependent again on Central Bank funds.
Similarly, a bill filed in the Senate calls for fresh
government equity infusions for new issues of capital stock of
rural banks, cooperative rural banks and evenprivate development
banks operating in rural areas. This is designed to develop
financial linkages between these rural financial institutions and
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in order to expand the
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financial resources of the rural sector for small farmer-
borrowers. In effect, LBP becomes the Apex bank. If the
intention is making LBP a conduit of government funds to rural
financial institutions, then the Apex bank concept may not be a
good one.
2. Deposit Retention Scheme
Actions Taken by the Monetary Board
The continuous drain of rural financial wealth into the
urban areas remains a major factor deterring the emergence of an
improved rural credit market. The fact that there are a number
of prospective investors in the rural sector should serve as an
impetus for financial institutions to increase the flow of credit
to the rural areas. With the rural sector serving as the
backbone of Philippine development in the medium term, the
problem must be addressed with appropriate policies consistent
with the objective of improving the rural financial market.
The policy response of the Monetary Authorities to correct
this problem was to implement the deposit retention scheme.
Initially, the scheme requires branches outside the National
Capital Region to invest at least 75 percent of their total
deposits, net of required reserves, on the same service areas
where these deposit resources were generated. Several
criticisms, however, have been aired by the banking group as well
as by some independent policy planners. Deposit retention policy
produces both distortionary effects on private and social
profitabilities. Banks are forced to finance less worthy
investments just to satisfy this requirement. This poses
obstacles in mobilizing deposits and also endanger the viability
of rural financial intermediaries since institutionally-fixed
portfolio composition held by banks as a result of this
regulation may not be optimal.
These developments were taken into account in the revised
version of the scheme contained in CB Circular 1183. Although
the 75 percent retention policy is still enforced, regional
groupings have been reduced to three enlarged groupings (i.e.,
Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao) from the previous twelve regional
groupings. This is an improvement over the previous policy since
financial institutions face a greater array of investment choices
in a wider market within the designated region.
Actions taken by the Legislative Body
A Senate bill calls for the retention of at least 80 percent
of the funds generated by financial institutions in the rural
areas. This is one of the steps through which this bill hopes to
promote financial intermediation in the rural areas.
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It is not mentioned in the bill that funds should be
invested inthe same service areas but allowed instead the
transfer of funds from one rural area to another through branches
of LBP, PNB and DBP preferably at the areas nearest the funding
source. Nevertheless, this is consistent with the Central Bank
policy on restraining the flow of locally generated funds to the
National Capital Region from other regions. Additional provision
prohibits any rural financial intermediaries to furnish, directly
or indirectly, to any multinational enterprise the funds
generated from the rural areas.
3. Bank Entry andBranching
Actions Taken by the Monetary Board
Past policies designed to create a more progressive
Philippine banking system through bigger capitalization, mergers
and consolidations, andrestricted branching in certain areas
have created bottlenecks in the physical growth of banks and
branches opened. For instance, the Central Bank's policy on
minimum capital requirement for a newly-opened bank discouraged
the opening of new rural banks which could not meet such
requirement.
Improved bank competition is essential in the provision of
low-cost financial services especially in the rural areas where
the rlisk factor is a big cost component in lending. Thus, the
Central Bank's policy of eliminating the prerequisite investment
in government securities for purposes of establishing/opening
branches and other banking offices through Circular 1188 is an
open invitation to expand banking services in rural areas. A
more liberal branching policy eliminates the possibility of a
single bank monopolizing the provision of financial services in
rural areas. Likewise, fr_e bank entry provides a wider array
of portfolio choices for borrowers, and a more varied financial
instruments which can be maintained by the surplus units.
Lamberte (1987) has found that the "institution" elasticity is
significantly greater than one. That is, more financial savings
can be mobilized by increasing the number of financial
institutions in the country.
Actions Taken bythe Legislative Body
InCongress, there is a similar move that calls for the
unrestricted entry of financial intermediaries in the rural
areas. This means that the problem of shortage of financial
institutions in the rural: areas is currently addressed. In
particular, a Senate bill seeks to exempt from Central Bank's
minimum capital, personnel and office facilities requirements
financial intermediaries operating in the rural areas, provided
that these intermediaries be subject to the minimum 10 percent
debt-to-equity ratio and :other CB financial ratios. At the
House, a bill has been filed seeking to exempt from taxes
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interest income of certain types of deposits with rural banks,
private development banks, savings banks, savings and loan
associations and even commercial banks, whose main offices and
principal operations are located in the countryside. Both these
bills serve as an open invitation for financial institutions to
expand their operations in rural areas which could help improve
the performance of rural financial market.
C. Rationalization of Government Regulations Affecting
Intermediation Cost
i. Actions Taken by the Monetary Board
The existence of high bank intermediation costs could hamper
the growth of rural financial market. Aside from the fact that
rural enterprises may be discouraged from availing themselves of
formal credit due to thehigh cost of lending, bankers would
rationalize the "flow-out" of rural resources in search of the
highest marginal return which urban-based projects offer in order
to maintain a certain profit margin level.
The policy response of the Monetary Authorities to reduce
Danks' intermediation costs has been the gradual reduction in
reserve requirements. Throughout the 1986-1988 period under the
new administration, the Monetary Board has reduced twice the
required reserves against deposit liaDilities with original
maturities of 73_ days or less for all banking institutions from
23 percent to 21 percent. For deposits with maturities over 730
days, the reserve requirement has been reduced to five percent
from six percent in 1986. This means that funds for lending
operation will be made more available especially in rural areas.
However, CB Circular 120.4 issued on June 23,.1.989 raises again
the reserve requirement of deposits with original maturities of
more than 730 days from five percent to sevenpercent.
As regards the agri/agra requirement and gross receipts
tax, there is nothing that the Monetary Authorities can do since
they were introduced through legislative actions except to
endorse to Congress the proposal to remove them.
2. Actions Taken by the Legislative Branch
Several bills have been filed in CongreSs seeking to reduce
hbank intermediation cost by eliminating oot the gross receipts
tax and the agri-agra scheme. In particular, S.B. 368 calls for
the abolition of the gross receipts tax on interest income of
banks, while S.B. 614 seeks to repeal P.D. 717 by abolishing the
25 percent agri/agra loan quota. These complement the Monetary
Authorities' effort to reduce the intermediation costs.
There are bills now being filed in Congress that suggest
either to modify existing loanportfolio requirements or to
introduce more loan portfoliourequirements to favor certain
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sectors of the society. In particular, a Senate bill seeks to
revive the required lending for agrarian reform beneficiaries
equivalent to 10 percent of a commercial bank's loanable funds as
originally set in P.D. 717. Recognizing the little impact of the
agri-agra scheme in ensuring the flow of credit to the intended
beneficiaries, S.B. 171 allows alternative compliance only by
buying Land Bank Agrarian Reform Credit Bonds, and the proceeds
of which shall be exclusively used for credit to agrarian reform
beneficiaries. Banks, however, will be penalized in holding low-
yield assets since these bonds carry an interest rate of four
percent per annum whic_ could increase banks' intermediation
costs.
Required lending for financing projects and livelihood
programs of fishermen all over the country equivalent to one
percent of the local bank's yearly liquid assets is also being
sought _in Congress through H.B. 1676. For microenterprises
lending, the requirement to set aside three percent of the
lending institution's total loan portfolio is endorsed in the
Senate through S.B. 743. Similarly, the House has proposed
through H.B. 1724 to direct all government and private banks to
set aside one percent of their yearly loanable funds for lending
programs of drivers all over the country.
As pointed out earlier, attempts to fix the loan portfolio
of banks may be detrimental to the present efforts of the
government to deregulate and improve the performance of the
financial system especially in the rural sector.
D. Continued Adoption of a Market-Determined Interest Rate
Policy
i. Actions Taken by the Monetary Authorities/Executive
Branch
In the past, the _rediscounting facility of the Central Bank
was used to allocate credit to high priority sectors. The
rediscount rate for the priority sectors ranged from three to
eight percent per annum with a prescribed ceiling on the lending
rate of banks between 12 to 14 percent per annum (See Table 5).
The rediscount value was between 50 to 100 percent. While the
lending rates were below the market rates, the huge spread
between rediscount and lending rates was very attractive to
banks.
Starting in November 1985, the rediscounting window of the
Central Bank has been used more for stabilization purposes rather
than for allocating credit to priority sectors. _his policy has
been maintained today. Specifically, the proportion of the loan
value that the Central Bank rediscounts has been standardized for
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Table 5
CENTRAL BANK REDISCOUNTING POLICY
(_ p.a.)
CB Lending
Rediscount Loan Rate a/
Circular Rate Value (Secured
Year Date Number High Low High Low Loans)
05-19-78 CLR 610 9.00 1.00 100 50
1980 09-24-80 CLR 762 9.00 1.00 100 50 14.00
1981 02-27-81CLR 784 8,00 3.00 100 80 16.00
03-10-81 CLR 786 8.00 3,00 100 80
06-18-81CLR 803 8.00 1.00 100 80
1982 05-23-82 CLR 930 8.00 1.00 100 80 17.13
1983 8.00 1.00 100 80 21.28
1984 01-23-84 CLR 991 LR-6 1.00 100 80 39.10
03-12-84 CLR 994 MRR-6 MRR-12 90 80
1985 05-30-85 CLR 1063 MRR-3 MRR-12 90 80 28.30
11-22-85 CLR 1086 12.75 12,75 80 80
1986 09-1-86 CLR 1114 11.75 11.75 80 80 17.30
12-15-86 CLR 1125 10.00 10.00 80 80
AM 12.27 12.27
1987 CLR 1125 10.00 10.00 80 80 13.30
1988 CLR 1125 10.00 10.00 80 80 15.92
MRR - Manila Reference Rate
LR - Lending Rate
a/ - Weighted Average for all maturities
b/ - Weighted Average for Transacted Rates
c/ - Weighted Average for 91-day T-Bill rates
SOURCES : CB Review (various issues)
CB Annual Report (various issues)
IMF International Financial Statistics (various issues)
IMF Survey (March 1989)
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all eligible papers at 80 percent. _/ And more importantly, a
uniform rediscount rate that is aligned with the market rate has
been applied. It is •based on the MRR90 which is re-evaluated
and, if necessary, adjusted every quarter. The method for
determining the MRR90 has recently been changed. Whereas the old
MRR90 was based on the interest rate on the promissory note with
a 9_-day • maturity, the new MRR90 which appeared starting in
January 1989 is based on the weighted average of the interest
rates on promissory notes and time deposits with a 90-day
maturity. The reason for changing the formula in determining the
rediscount rate is that •the relative share of promissory note has
substantially declined vis-A-vis time deposits over the most
recent past. Recently, banks base their marginal cost of funds
on time deposit rate.
Under the previous regime, numerous special credit programs
proliferated. Some of them were managed by financial
institutions, wnile others, by non-financial institutions.
Under the Department of Agriculture alone, there used to be
forty-six separate loan funds for various Commodity programs.
All of them were lent at highly concessionary rates. In 1986,
twenty out of the forty-six separate loan funds were merged to
create the so-called Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF).
The pooled CALF funds are now being used to beef up the resources
of the following four guarantee programs: Philippine Crop
Insurance Corporation; Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium
Enterprises; Quedan Guarantee Fund Board; and Bagong Pagkain ng
Bayan (guarantee funds for loans to local government units). The
remaining twenty-six separate loan funds could not be
consolidated with the CALF mainly because they are covered by
existing agreements between the government and donor countries/
multilateral agencies. Most of the non-CALF agricultural lending
programs carry non-market rates (See Table 6), whereas CALF's
special lending programs follow the market rates (See Table 7).
There are also special lending programs for other sectors
other than the agricultural sector that are still being
maintained by non-financial government institutions (See Table
8). Interestingly, three of these six credit programs were
created only recently. Two of the six credit programs still
carry rates that are below market rates.
Under the IGLF program, the interest rate charged on
loans to participating banks is based on the average rate of time
deposits with maturities of two years or• more during the
preceding six months if the fixed interest rate is applied, or
the average rate of time deposits with maturities of up to six
7/
Eligible• papers include agricultural products credits,
cottage and small industries credits, general purposes working
and capital financing, and other short-term credits.
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NON-CALFSPECIALCREDITPROGRAMS
...................................................................................................................
Programs InterestRatesa/ PastDueb/ Repaymentc/
Ratio(%) Rate(%)
...................................................................................................................
(I) GFSME Prevailingbankrate 20 73
(2) quedanFinancingProgram
GrainsBusinessmen Prevailingbankrate 12 99
Farmers'Groups 15%perannumforQGFBdirectlending 5 99
prevailingbankinterestrate
FoodMarketRetailers i0%p.a.fordailyamortization 26 98
12_p,a,forweeklyamortization
14%p,a,formonthlyamortization
IB_p,a,forquarterlyamortization
FoodandAgricultural Lendingconduitsoendborrower 58 81
MarketEnterprises 12%p,a,forweeklyamortization
14%p.a.formonthlyamortization
16%p.a,forquarterlyamortization
(3) BagongKilusangKabuhayan d/
atKaunlaransaBayan 16%p.a.(fundsourcetolendingconduits)* 0 20
(4) landBank:Cotton 15%p,a.(LBPtoultimateborrower)* 63 67
FinancingProgram 12%(LBPtoCoopRBs)*
15%(CRBstoultimateborrowers)
(5) AgrioulturalLoanFundProject ll,B_CBtoPFIseffectivelyJuly-Sept,i989 0 I00
(market-oriented)
(BY PalawanIntegratedArea 3% (short-termf omfund-sourceto 2 I00
DevelopmentProject lendingconduits)=
lIp,a,(Medium/Long-termfromfund-
sourcetolendingcounduts)
I0_p.a.(Short-termf omlending
conduitsoendborrowers)
14_p,a,(Medium/Long-termfromlending
conduitsoendborrowers)
(7) Agro-lndustrialTechnology 8,75%p,a,(directlending)* 2 72
TransferProgram
(BY PrivateSectorModernizationProgramII%p,a. (directlending)* 7 83
(9) AquacultureDevelopment 14%p.a. I I00
Project (lendingconduitsoendborrowers)
(i0)NorthernPalawanFisheries 7.5%p,a,+ ,75%commissioncharge 0 73
DevelopmentProject (fundsourcetolendingconduit)*
12%p,a,(lendingconduitsoendborrower)*
(II)NorthernSamarIntegrated iS%p.a.(lendingconduitsoendmusers)* I0 80
CreditFinancingProgram
a/ FiBuresarebasedoninterestsrateasofMarch31,19a9.
b/ Loanspastdueoverloansoutstanding
c/ Loanscollectedoverloansmatured
d/ Loanscollectedoverloansgranted
• Fixedinterestrates
Source:AgriculturalCreditPolicyCouncil.
Table 7
CALF SPECIAL CREDIT PROGRANS
Programs Interest Rate Past Due RepaymentRates (% Rate (%)
(1) Integrated Rural Prevailing bank rate 6 97
Financing Program
(2) Quedan Financing Prevailing bank rate 0 100
Program for Allied
Products
(3) Cooperative Marketing Prevailing bank rate 39 70
Project
Source" Agricultural Credit Policy Council
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Table 8
SOMEFEATURESOFTHELENDINGPROGRAMS
......................................................................................
PROGRAMSTARTOF SOURCESIMPLEMENTING
OPERATIONRESOURCESOFFUNDSORGANIZATION/ELIGIBILITY LOANPURPOSE
OFFICE
......................................................................................
a)TST 1987 PIOOM Govt. DTI NGO I)fixedassets
$8.BN ADS 2)production
3)advanceto
contractors
andsub-
contractors
a/
b) IGLF 1952 $321N USAID IndustrialManufacturingI)working
IBRD GuaranteeandendService capital
LoanFund, industries 2)fixedassets
_ CentralBankwithtotal acquisition
assetsfrom 3) packing
PSOO,OOOmp20M4) production
c) EIMP tgso PIBS.SN OECF Technology Resource-basedI) fixed assets
LivelihoodExportMenu- acquisition
Resource facturingand
Center Processing
Enterprises
d)EDAP 1987 P20M KKK TechnologyExportMenu- I)working
Livelihoodfacturingand capital
•Resource Processing
Center Enterprises
e)PITC i988 PIOM PITC PhilippineExportMenu- I)working
Internationalfacturingand capital
Trading Processing 2)raw-materiels
CorporationwithAssets
notmorethan
PIOM
f)TF 1984 PIB.5 KKK LivelihoodManufacturingI)working
CorporationEnterprises capital
withL/Cs,POs 2)rawmmaterials
a/startingJanuary1989.
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(Table 8 pont'd)
...................................................................................................................
PROGRAM
LOANREQUIREMENTS LOANCEILING INTEREST MATURITYPRIORITYPRODUCTSOTHERHIGHLIGHTS
...................................................................................................................
a)TST realestate, PIM perborrower Market 5 years garments,gifts,
buildings rate andhousewares,
machineries furniture,metal-
workingfootwear,
leathergoods
b)IGLFDIE- 80:20 a)cottageP150,000-Market I) 7 years
Collateral- real P.4M rate 2) 12years none providesoptional
estate,governmentb)small P150,000- 3) IBOdays guaranteecoverage
securities P,4M 4) I year 1)collateral
ProjectStudy c)mediumP 50,000- short- max.of
PIBM 25%of loan
2) creditrisk -
BOZof loan
for small
c)EIMP Collateral- pro- P 5M 10% 10years woodworking,
jectassets buildingcomponent-
relatedproducts,
foodprocessing,
garments,light
metals
d)EDAP D/E- 80:20 P2M 12% Termloans:I non-traditional
Collateral-unincum- year export-products
beredpersonal/project Creditline
assets,L/C,invento- accomodation: .
riesofrawmaterials expirydate
andfinishedgoods ofL/Coras
negotiated
>
e)PITC Collateral- L/C 70%ofL/Cvalueor Market Expirydate non-traditional
P2OO,OOOwhicheverrate ofL/C export-productsor
ishigher allpriority
productsofITG
f).TF Collateral-unincum-80%ofL/Cand/or 18% 6months none
beredrealestate, POnottoexceed
personal/project.P750,000(domestic)
assets,chattel PI,O00,O00(foreign)
mortgage
...................................................................................................................
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months if the variable interest rate is applied. Banks may
charge the market rate to end-user borrowers. However, borrowers
located in underdeveloped areas of the country are supposed to be
charged a rate that is two percentage points below the market
rate. The main reason for instituting such policy is that
borrowers in depressed areas usually have higher transaction
costs in accessing the IGLF facility due to distance and poor
infrastructure facilities. IGLF encourages banks to follow the
policy by differentiating its lending rate to banks located in
various areas of the country. The lending rate structure of IGLF
loans to participating banks for the period 23 January 1989 to
the present is shown in Table 9.
2. Actions Taken by the Legislative Branch
There are several bills now being filed in Congress that
have direct bearing on interest rate policy (See Tables 2a and
2b). They may be classified according to the following: (i)
those that espouse the free market view of interest rate
determination; (2) those that recommend limiting the bank
spread; (3) those that espouse a ceiling on the rates; and (4)
those that recommend preferential rates for certain sectors of
the economy.
Lawmakers recognize the need to improve access of certain
sectors of the society to the formal credit system. The most
common mechanism proposed is to require banks to allocate a
certain percentage of their loanable funds to target groups.
Except for one bill, all bills that recommend a loan portfolio
requirement leave the interest rate determination of these loans
to the market. This is a marked improvement over the past
wherein loan portfolio requirement was often associated with
concessionary rates.
An important bill now being deliberated is House Bill No.
19740. Specifically, it limits the effective intermediation
spread (EIS), which is the difference between the nominal
interest rate on a loan and the specific financial institution's
composite cost of funds, according to the following schedule:
i. For loans maturing within 360 days - 6 percent
2. Loans with maturities of 361 to 720 days - 7 pe[cent
3. Loans with maturities of 721 to 1080 days - 8 percent
4. Loans with maturities of 1081 to 1440 days - 9 percent
5. Loans with maturities of 1441 days or more - 10 percent
This proposed legislation is different from the one of
fixing t_e interest rates. While it fixes the intermediation
spread, nevertheless, it allows the lending rate to vary in
5O
Table 9
INTEREST RATES ON IGLF AVAILMENTS OF
PARTICIPATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(For the period 23 January to 30 June 1989)
Interest Rate
Per Annum (_)
Location of Project
Fixed Variable
National Capital Region (NCR) 14.1 12.1
Region I 12.1 10.1
Region II 12.1 10.1
Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) 11.1 9.1
Region III 14.1 12.1
Region IV (except Quezon, Aurora, Romblon,
Marinduque, Palawan, and Nindoro) 14.1 12.1
Region V 11.1 9.1
Region VI (except AntiQue, Aklan and
Capiz) 13.1 11.1
Region VII (except Bohol, Negros Oriental
and Siquijor) 14.1 12.1
Region VIII 11.1 9.1
Region IX 11.1 9.1
Region X (except Camiguin) 13.1 11.1
Region XI 13.1 11.1
Region XII 12.1 10.1
Quezon, Palawan, Capiz and Aklan 12.1 10.1
Bohol, Antique, Siquijor, Mindoro, Aurora,
Rombolon, Marinduque, and Camiguin 11.1 9.1
Negros Oriental 13.1 11.1
Source: CB Circular No. 89-01 (January 1989).
$I
accordance with the cost of funds for a certain term loan.
However, the lending rate of a particular term loan which is
determined by the proposed formula may not reflect the market
rate since _t is constrained by the spread. Thus, the formula
may yield results that squarely contradict the proposed bill's
declaration of policy i.e., " .... allowing a regime of market-
oriented determination of the cost of money." Additionally,
average cost pricing will always result in inefficiencies
compared with marginal cost pricing except at the point where the
average cost is equal to the marginal cost.
Putting a limit to the effective intermediation spread
assumes that the EIS enjoye d by banks is way beyond what society
should allow. This may be an unfair assumption. If the EIS is
indeed very high at all times, it is necessary to analyze first
why it is too high before offering a sweeping solution. The way
to do it is to examine the following major components of EIS:
(i) regulation-induced intermediation cost (e.g., reserve
requirement, gross receipts tax, agri-agra loan requirement,
etc.);
(2) transaction costs of banks; and
(3) net spread.
Understanding these components of EIS can help us formulate
rational policies. In a separate study (See Lamberte 1987), the
adverse impact of some regulations on intermediation costs have
been analyzed. The recommendation arrived at from the results of
the study is to lower the reserve requirement and abolish the GRT
and agri-agra requirement.
As regards transaction costs, the latest study by Untalan
(1988) shows that the cost per peso loan outstanding for all
sample banks is about three percent. The lending cost of banks
is affected by at least two factors. One is inefficiency.
Usually, banks have no drive to improve efficiency if there is
lack of competition. In this regard, the proper policy is to
encourage more competition among banks. The other one is
information cost. In an imperfect market, banks can greatly
reduce default rates by gatherinc more information about the
client and his/her projects. Inf marion is costly to obtain,
however. In this regard , there _s some scope for government
intervention by producing those i formation needed by banks in
evaluating loan applications. F.sk-pooling and risk reducing
programs can also greatly help reduce banks' transaction costs.
As regards net spread, it ha , been shown in an earlier stud_7
(See Lamberte 1983) that the ccamercial banks wer9 enjoying a
very comfortable net spread, r ansidering the widening of the
gross spread in the recent pas_ (See Lamberte 1987), the net
spread realized by banks at present could be the same as when the
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earlier study was conducted. However, there is no reason at all
to rush to legislation limiting the net spread to be realized by
banks if they are seen to be enjoying huge netspread. It could
be that the net spread currently enjoyed by banks is the optimal
one considering returns of alternative investment opportunities.
If this were the case, then putting a cap on the net spread may
force banks to move out of the banking industry, thus further
aggravating our problems with having a weak intermediation
system. However, if the huge net spread is brought about by the
oligopoly power of banks, then either of the following two alter-
native policies can be done: (i) put a limit to the net spread
but allow banks to continue exercising their oligopoly power;
or (2) reduce the oligopoly power of banks by encouraging more
competition. New banking regulations discussed earlier seem to
favor the second option.
Having a uniform EIS for all loans of the same maturity is
tantamount to asking banks not to lend to small borrowers. It is
known that the per peso cost of a small loan is higher than that
of a large loan. Moreover, banks that specialize in lending to
small borrowers could close shop. Untalan (1988) has shown that
the cost of maintaining each peso of loan outstanding is six
percent for rural banks, three percent for private development
banks and two percent for commercial banks.
Another thing that must be considered is inflation
expectations. In another study (See Lamberte 1985), it has been
demonstrated that given a 20 percent reserve requirement, and
forcing banks to obtain zero net profits, the spread or
difference between nominal and lending rates could vary depending
on inflation expectations. For example, if we were to obtain a
real deposit rate of five percent per annum, then the nominal
intermediation spread for a one-year loan should be 1.25 percent,
3.75 percent and 6.75 percent for an inflation rate of zero
percent, 10 percent and 20 percent, respectively. This just goes
to show t_at fixing the financial intermediation spread would be
distortionary.
Interest rates on all types of loans with formal
institutions have been deregulated since 1983. At present,
however, some lawmakers are seriously considering of reimposing
an interest rate control on selected types of financial
institutions. In particular, a bill has been filed in the Senate
seeking to fix the)lending rates of pawnshops. This may be
unfair to pawnshops since other types of financial institutions
are not subjected to any interest rate ceilings. Moreover, it
could frustrate the rapid growth of one of the alternative
sources of funds for households and small entrepreneurs.
Lamberte (1988) has discussed the role played by pawnshops in the
development process. With liberal licensing policy and absence
of interest rate control, pawnshops have proliferated recently
not only in urban areas but in rural areas as well. The recently
stiffer competition among pawnshops has brought down the lending
rates.
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Another bill seeks to formalize the informal credit market
but subject it to interest rate ceilings. Aside from heavy
administrative burden to be shouldered by a regulatory agency
which will _onitor all small credit transactions, the proposed
interest rate ceilings for different loan sizes in the informal
credit market would have adverse consequences on the supply of
credit, thus further aggravating the plight of small borrowers
who do not have access to the formal credit markets. In
addition, those occasional lenders who are not charging any
interest on their loans to their friends/relatives will now be
forced to charge a rate to compensate for the extra cost they
will incur in keeping records of the loans and issuing receipts.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
This section assesses quantitatively the results of the
policies and strategies adopted by the Aquino administration in
the financial sector. Admittedly, some of the policies have been
installed only very recently, e.g., an end to the moratorium on
giving new bank licenses, and therefore their results cannot be
captured within the period of analysis. Moreover, effects of
certain policies take some time, and the lags could vary among
them. .These factors should be taken into consideration in
interpreting results.
A. Structure and Performance of the Financial System
The growth of the total resources of the financial system
in real terms was arrested in 1983 when a balance-of-payments
crisis struck the economy (See Table 10 and Figure I). It
rebounded in 1987 but registering only a very slight percentage
increase in real terms of 0.96 percent. The 1988 real growth
rate of 5.53 percent is still much lower than the 13.84
percent registered in 1983. Although signs of improving
performance are becoming visible in the financial system, the
1988 real assets are still much lower than the pre-crisis period.
The Philippine financial system has always been dominated by
the commercial banking system. The relative shares of the
different types of financial institutions in the total resources
of the financial system have been fairly stable even during the
1986-88 period. The notable exception, however, is that of
specialized government banks. Its share in the total assets of
the financial system was pared down by one-half which was mainly
brought about by the transfer of the huge amount of non-
performing assets of DBP to the National Government. In terms of
deposit generation, the entire financial system reached the
highest annual real growth rate of 10.52 percent in 1982 (See
Table ii). But in 1984, heavy peso withdrawals hit the deposit-
taking activities of banks placing the growth rate of deposits in
real terms atnegative 28 percent. The negative annual real
growth rates of the financial system's deposit liabilities
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Table I0
TOTALRESOURCESOFTHEPHILIPPINEFINANCIALSYSTEM
BYTYPEOFINSTITUTION
Year-Ends1980-1988
(InMillionPesos)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
CommercialBanks 138417,1164614,6190977,42 Zg25.2289150,9253347,I248542,32T4499.0328847.5
(0.56) (0.55) (0,56) (0,58) (0.59) (0.56) (0,60) (0,61) (0.63)
Thrift Banks 10557,6 11631,1 12585,6 16149.014967,8 15081,3 17652.3 19557,4 24932.7
(0,04)!0,04) (0.04)(0.041 (0,03) I0.03) (0,04) (0.04) (0.05)
SavingsBanks 1352,4 5930.5 5872,4 7399,4 7618,8 6847,2 8124,4 10534,1 14165,4
(0,03) (0.02) (0.02) (0,02) (0,02) (0.01) (0,02) (0.02) (0,03)
Private Dev'tBanks 1620,8 2631,4 3703,0 4613,2 4525.3 5084,2 5624,5 5474.5 6698,6
(0,oii (0,01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)(0.01) (0,01) (0,01) (0,01)
StockSavingsand 1584,8 2069.2 3010.2 4135.4 2828,7 3149,9 3903,4 3548,8 4068,7
Loanskssn_ (0,01) (0.01) (0.01) (0,01) (0.01) (0,01) (0,01) (0.01) (0.01)
SpecializedGov't.Banks 34206.9 43179,6 533t5,9 85323,9 78614.987989.4 28555.726287,5 27246.6
(0,14)(0,14) (0,16)(0,15) (0.16) (0,18) (0.07)(0.06) (0.05)
RuralBanks 5642,2 6631,2 8136.5 9499.7 9023,3 8821,7 9350,5 9960,8 11018,8
(0.02)(0,02) (0,02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0,02)(0,021 (0,02)
Non-Banks 58945,763302.2 74154,692033.495480,BIOT25g,3112998,3121380,4131089,6
(0,24) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0,20) (0,21) (0,27) (0,27) (0.25)
TOTALASSETS:Nominal 24TT69.5298358.7339170.0430934,248723T,7502498.8417099.1451685.1523135.2
Real 185013,1201866,5 211584.5240879.9181731.2158515,9 129413,3130658,1 137884,8
......................... . ........................................................................................
Note:Figuresinparenthesesarethecorrespondingratiostothe
totalnominalassets
Source:DER-Domestic,CentralBank
Figure 1: Phil. Financial System
Total Assets Nominal vs. Real (1978)
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Table 11
PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
DEPOSIT LIABILITIES AND LOAN PORTFOLIO
1980-1987
(In Million Pesos)
Deposit Loan
Liabilities Portfolio
Nominal Real Nominal Real
1980 89538 67221 141978 106590
1981 99641 67416 159067 107623
1982 119436 74508 186714 116478
1983 142275 79528 239172 133690
1984 153569 57280 247077 92159
1985 164435 51872 209067 65952
1986 166469 51650 156455 48543
1987 178079 51513 178039 51501
Source: Philippine Financial System
1987 Fact Book
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continued up to the second year of the Aquino rule though there
was a big improvement compared to the last year of the Marcos
rule. In 1986, real growth rate was placed at negative 0.43
percent as compared to negative 9.44 percent in 1985, and
improved further to negative 0.26 percent in 1987. The real
levels attained, however, under the new administration are
still much lower to the pre-1985 period despite the recently
rising trend of nominal deposit liabilities.
The same is true with the lending operations of the
financial system. In 1984, real growth rate registered at
negative 31 percent which continued all the way up to the first
year of the Aquino rule. Lending operations began to go up
again in 1987 registering a growth rate of six percent in real
terms. However, demand, short-term and intermediate-term lending
largely account for the improvement in the lending operations in
1987. They were used mainly to finance temporary (i.e.,
consumer-led) increases in aggregate output (See Table 12).
Long-term lending lagged behind and even deteriorated from the
previous year's level reflecting the failure to develop the long-
term capital market that could sustain long-term investment. It
should however be noted that in 1987, a comfortable level of
political stability was not yet achieved. During the 1986-88
period, there was a marked improvement in the financing of
lending activities through the use of deposit resources (See
Table 13). Throughout the 198-0-85 period, deposit generation
continued to lag behind the lending operations which means that
other sources (i.e., CB rediscounting, government subsidies,
etc.) could have been widely utilized by the financial system.
This was due to the active involvement of the Central Bank and
other government agencies in lending operations through several
highly subsidized credit programs which made some banks,
especially rural banks, mere conduits of these funds. Thus, this
dependence failed to emphasize among financial institutions their
deposit-taking activities. During the 1986-87 period, loans-
to-deposit ratio went below unity suggesting that banks are
becoming less dependent on borrowings, or conversely becoming
more dependent on deposits. Similarly, there was an improvement
in the use of deposit resources in financing the increase in the
assets of the financial system. Beginning the first year of
Aquino rule, close to 40 percent of the financial system's total
resources had been financed through deposit liabilities which
remained almost in the same level the following year. Thus, as a
whole, it can be said that financial intermediation has visibly
improved in the most recent years.
B. Central Bank RediscountinH
Liquidity management is one of the major functions of the
Central Bank. This is anchored on the classical hypothesis of a
strong inflatioh rate-money supply-monetary base linkage. Once
an inflation rate target for a certain period is decided on, the
Central Bank then determines the level of monetary base that is
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Table 12
DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS BY MATURITY
1980 - 1987
(In Million Pesos)
Year-End Demand Short-term Intermediate-Term Long-term Total
1980 10,458.2 49,843.3 7,746.8 9,149.3 77,198.1
(0.13) (0.65) (0.10) (0.12)
1981 10,667.3 52,823.4 14,976.2 8,038.3 86,505.2
(0.12) (0.61) (0.17) (0.09)
1982 9,307.8 58,478.0 17,778.3 12,675.5 98,239.6
(0.09) (0.59) (0.18) (0.13)
1983 10,433.8 66,792.1 16,858.2 17,303.6 111,387.7
(0.09) (0.60) (0.15) (0.15)
1984 8,322.1 62,651.7 28,226.5 17,181.9 116,382.2
(0.07) (0.54) (0.24) (0.15)
1985 8,060.5 50,038.4 14,667.9 14,806.5 87,573.3
(0.09) (0.57) (0.17) (0.17)
1986 10,529.1 46,869.5 15,042.1 10,646.7 83,087.4
(0.13) (0.56) (0.18) (0.13)
a/
1987 17,212.3 52,524.4 19,183.9 5,966.7 94,887.3(0.18) (0.55) (0.20) (0.06)
a/ As of September, 1987.
Note: Figures in parentheses are the corresponding ratios to the
total loans.
Source: Central Bank Statistical Bulletin, 1987.
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Table 13
PHILIPPINE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
SELECTED RATIOS
1980-1987
Deposits-to-Asset Loans-to-Deposit
Ratio Ratio
1980 0.3614 1.5857
1981 0.3340 1.5964
1982 0.3521 1.5633
1983 0.3302 1.6811
1984 0,3152 1,6089
1985 0.3272 1.2714
1986 0.3991 0.9398
1987 0.3943 0.9998
Source: Philippine Financial System
1987 Fact Book
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deemed consistent with that target. It does this by manipulating
the components of the monetary base over whioch it has greater
control.
The major components of the monetary base are the Net
Foreign Assets (NFA) and Net Domestic Assets (NDA). The latter
can be more readily controlled by the Central Bank. NDA can be
further decomposed into net credits to the public sector (NCPS),
net credit to the deposit money banks (NCDMB), and others
(NDAOTHERS). The action of the Central Bank with respect to its
rediscounting window is reflected in the NCDMB. For instance, if
the Central Bank increases its rediscounting of export loans,
then NCDMB increases, ultimately resulting in an increase in the
monetary base, assuming other things being equal. However,
increases in the monetary base arising from the rediscounting
window may be completely offset by conducting an open market
operation. The Central Bank may do this by selling either its
own liabilities (e.g., CB bills, reverse repos) or National
Treasury's liabilities (i.e., Treasury bills). In the former
case, NCDMB is literally kept constant, while in the latter case,
NCDMB is allowed to increase, but the increase is offset by an
equivalent decline in the NCPS.
The rediscounts of the Central Bank to commercial banks
dropped sharply during the 1983-84 balance-of-payments crisis
(See Tables 14 and 15). Stabilization measures implemented by
the Central Bank and greatly reduced demand for credit during the
crisis period accounted for the sharp decline in rediscounts.
The level of rediscounts (both outstanding and granted) in 1988
has not yet been restored to the pre-crisis period, although
demand for credit has picked up quite fast as may be gathered
from the figures on the loans outstanding of commercial banks
(See Table 14). In 1988, banks were still liquid, although less
liquid than the previous years, hence there was less demand for
rediscounts.
The Central Bank seems to be pursuing an export-oriented
rediscounting policy. This is understandable since the
Philippines has been confronted with a balance-of-payments
problem in the last few years. Indeed, it is easier for banks tO
obtain rediscounting on export loans than on non-export loans.
Within the export sector, the non-traditional sector is given
priority over the traditional sector as may be gathered from the
amounts of rediscounts (outstanding and granted) going to the
former.
Currently, the Central Bank sees to it that the export
sector's access to the rediscounting window will not be grossly
affected by any change in the monetary policy (i.e., a change
from easy to tight monetary policy). This is reflected in the
way it manages liquidity. The Central Bank makes a forecast of
exports every quarter. This forms the basis for determining the
net increase in the rediscounting of export loans that the
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Table 14
OUTSTANDINGREDISCOUNTSOFTHECENTRALBANK,
LOANSOUTSTAND[NGOFCOMMERCIALBANKS,AND
COMMODITYEXPORTS
(a) (b)
Average: Total Export
Exchange:Rediscountso Rediscounts
Rate :CommercialB nks........................................................
'............... Total Traditional Non-TraditionalYear Year (P/S),
:(P,)(US$N)(P,)(USSM)(PM) (USSN) (PN)(USSM)
1980 1980 7.51 9019 1208.9 3969 528.50 2259 300.80 1710227.70
16BI 1981 7.90 11383 1440.9 2736 346.33 1234 156.20 1502 190.13
1982 1962 8,54 12963 2400.6 2583 302_6 950 111.24 1633 191.22
1963 IgB3 11.11 0504 765.4 1955 175.97 72 6.46 1883 169,49
1984 1984 16.70 4533 271.4 2092 125.27 1446 86.59 646 38.68
1965 1985 18.61 5121 275.2 2162 116.17 1077 57.67 1065 58.30
1968 1966 20.39 3167 155.3 1174 57.56 866 43.45 286 14.12
1967 1987 20.57 3609 175.4 1736 84.39 1035 50.32 701 34.08
1988 1988 21,08 3559 166.7 1983 94.00 1026 46.04 957 45.37
(c) (d)
Total Loans
Outstandingof Commodity
CommercialBanks Exports (bJ/(a) (b)/(c) (b)/(d)
Year ...................................... 'I
(PM) (US$N) (eM) (0S$M) :
1960 77198 10279.4 43467.9 6788 0.437 0.051 0.091
1981 86505 10950.0 45203.8 5722 0.240 0.032 0.061
1982 96240 18192.6 42879.3 5021 0.199 0.026 0.060
1963 ilf3B8 10025.9 55605.6 5005 0.230 0.018 0.035
1984 116382 6969.0 90029.7 5391 0.462 0.018 0.023
1985 87573 4705.7 86145.7 4629 0.422 0.025 0.025
1986 83087 4074,9 98748,8 4843 0.371 0.014 0.012
lgBT 86936 4717.1 117660.4 5720 0.481 0.018 0.015
1986115392,4a/ 5470.2 149139.5 7070 0.557 0.017 0.013
m/ Asof Sept. 1968
SOURCE: CentralBank
Table t5
LOANS GRANTED BY THE CENTRAL BANK TO COMMERCIAL BANKS
(In # M)
m
(a) (b) (c) b + c b c
1/ Traditional Non-Traditional
Total Exports Exports a c a
1980 38,707 20,000 11,607 0 82 0 52 0.30
1981 48 096 19,571 I3,884 0 73 0 42 0.30
1982 39 121 15,459 10,833 0 67 0 40 0.28
1983 28 229 8,256 12,028 0 72 0 29 0.43
1984 14 392 1,568 t0,805 0 86 0 11 0.75
1985 7 040 575 5,787 0 90 0 08 0.82
1986 9,696 2,251 6,322 0 88 0 23 0.65
t987 5,173 1,485 3,493 0.96 0 29 0.68
1988 9,582 2,150 6,959 0.95 0 22 0.73
1/
Includes other loans.
Source: Central Bank
63
Central Bank could allow for the reference quarter. Aside from
this, the Interagency Study Group on External. Trade Statistics
and Projections Foreign Operations Committee which is headed by
the Central Bank meets with exporters twice a year to validate
its medium-term forecast of exports. Thus, going back to the
liquidity management approach followed by the Central Bank which
was discussed earlier, the projected net increase in the
rediscounts of expart loans will cause an increase in NCDMB,
which in turn will exert an upward pressure on the monetary
base, other things being equal. If the projected increase in the
monetary base arising from the net increase in the rediscounting
of export loans exceeds the level that is thought to be
consistent with the inflation rate target, the Central Bank will
not ad3ust downwards its rediscounting of export loans, but
rather will engage itself in open market operation to bring down
the increase in the monetary base to its targeted level.
Table 16 shows that the interest rates on reverse repos and
Treasury bills haveconsistently been above the Central Bank's
rediscounting rate, except in 1988 for reverse repos. It
suggests that rediscounted loans have been subsidized by Central
Bank, in the case where reverse repos were used to mop up
liquidity, and Dy the national government, in the case where the
Treasury bills were used. This subsidy could partly neutralize
the penalty on exports arising from trade policy biases (See
Medalla 1989).
C. Stability of the Financial System
The financial system has always been under stress. It
suffered a severe liquidity crisis in 1981 that resulted in the
closure of some large investment houses and thrift banks. Six
financially distressed commercial banks ended up in government's
hands. Just as the financial system started to recover from the
1981 liquidity crisis, a-balance-of-payments, the worst by far
in Philippine history, struck the economy in 1983 and 1984.
Between 1981 and 1985, the Central Bank closed a total of 119
banks, of which two were commercial banks (See Table 17).
The occurrence of bank failures has continued during the
Aquino Administration. During the 1986-1987 period, the Central
Bank closed a total of 54 banks of which 50 were rural banks.
However, all these were due to the unsustained losses incurred
by banks during the 1983-84 balance-of-payments crisis. Note
that nine relatively large banks had collapsed since 1968, and
two of them occurred in 1987 (See Table 18). PISO Development
Bank, the largest privately-owned development bank in the country
which was one of the conduits of foreign currency loans from
multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and Asian
Development Bank, lost heavily on its foreign currency loans of
more than @500 M during the crisis as the value of peso fell
sharply against the dollar. Then, in January 1987, it was hit by
massive withdrawals for two consecutive weeks when it failed to
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Table 16
COMPARISON OF REDISCOUNT RATES, TREASURY BILL
RATE AND REVERSE REPURCHASE RATE
(In • per annum)
CB Treasury Reverse
Year Rediscount Bil] Repurchase
Rate 1/ Rate 2/ Rate
1980 9.00 12.14 -
1981 8.00 12.55 -
1982 8,00 13.79 -
1983 8.00 14,23 13,93
1984 MRR-6 27,16 29,25
1985 HRR-3 19.65 24,18
1986 12.27 16.90 13,25
1987 10.00 11.50 11..64
1988 10.00 13.59 9,85
1/ Thehighest rate is presented here (see
a]so Table III. ).
2/ Weighted average for 91-day T-bi]] rate.
3/ Weighted average for transacted rates.
Sources: Central Bank Circu]ars (.various issuances).
Centra] Bank Review (various issues).
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Table 17
NUMBER OF CLOSED PDIC MEMBER BANKS
Bank Group 1981-1985 1986-1987 Total
Commercial Banks 2 1 3
Savings and Mortgage Banks 4 - 4
Private Development Banks 3 1 4
Stock Savings and Loan Associations 22 2 24
Rural Banks 88 50 138
AllBanks 119 54 173
Source: PDIC Annual Reports (various years).
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Table 1B
LARGEBANKSCLOSEDBYTHEMONETARYBOARD
OFTHECENTRALBANK
Dateof CB No.of Deposits
Bank Takeover Deposit (In PN)
Accounts
i/
(I) OverseasBankofManila B-02-BB 13,061 49.40
2/
(2) ContinentalBank 6-25-74 60,128 121.20
3/
(3) GeneralBankandTrustCo. 3-25-77 157,977 199.60
4/
(4) RoyalSavingsBank,Inc. 7-06-84 302,580 350.70
(5) BancoFilipino Savings 1-25-65 2,413,000 897.00
& Mortga9eBank
5/
(6) PhilippineV teransBank 4-10-85 nodata l,BO0,O0
e/
(7) PacificBankingCorp. 7-05-85 no data 3,058.00
(B) FISODevelopmentBank 2-04-87 20,OBB 206,30
(9) ManilaBankingCorp. ' 5-25-87 633,614 1,905,20
1/
Resumedoperationon January8, 1981underthe nameCommercialBankof Manila,
2/
Resumednormaloperationon Nay31, 1977underthe nameAllied BankingCorporation.
a/
Resumednormaloperationon September19, 1977underthe nameof Internationa] CorporateBank.
4/
ResumednormaloperationonSeptemberll, 1984underthe nameof CommercialSavingsBank,
a subsidiaryofCOMBANK(nowrenamedBostonBankofthePhilippines);
s/
Datapertain to end-1984.Notethat P1.48of the PI.6Bdepositsweregovernmentdeposits.
B/
Asof Decembert984, In 1967,FarEastBankandTrust Go. (FEBTC)wonthe bid to operatePacific
Bank's43branchesall over the countryandsincethen hasbeenservicingall depositorsof
the closedPacificBank.
Source:POlOAnnualReportsandCentralBank.
le
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clear its checking transactions with a commercial bank as
required by the Monetary Board Resolution No. 131 which took
effect on 19 January 1987. The Central Bank's assistance to PISO
Bank failed to reverse its deteriorating financial condition.
The bank was later on found insolvent and closed by the Central
Bank on 4 February 1987. At the date of its closure, PISO Bank
had 20,088 deposit accounts with a total value of _206 M.
Just three months after the closure of PISO Bank, a
universal bank collapsed. This somehow shattered the view that
size connotes stability. Manila Bank actually suffered from a
bank run in 1984, rapidly depleting its deposits which stood at
@4.1 B at end-1983. The Central Bank continued propping up the
Manila Bank until the latter's overdrafts with the Central Bank
reached a staggering level of @6.1 B in May 1987. It eventually
closed Manila Bank in that month. As of the date of its closure,
Manila Bank had 633,614 deposit accounts valued at @1.9 B.
It appears from these new developments that the Central Bank
is intensely pursuing its policy of weeding out weak banks to
restore confidence in the system.
The deposit insurance system plays a vital role in the
financial system. In the US, confidence in the banking system
has never been diminished despite several bank failures since the
establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation which
has been promptly paying insured deposits of failed banks. The
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) was established
in 1969 with the aim of protecting small depositors as well as of
developing a strong and progressive banking system. Although
PDIC regularly assesses banking development and conducts
examinations on member banks, it remains powerless in aver£ing
bank failure.
PDIC has been slow in paying depositors of insured deposits.
As Table 19 shows, it was still servicing 39,095 deposit
accounts of banks which were closed prior to 1987. In some
cases, it resorted to paying depositors by installment. For
instance, depositors of PISO Bank and Manila Bank were paid only
@10,000 initially instead of the @40,000 coverage.
The low capitalization of PDIC has been the main cause for
its inability to promptly pay depositors. It has been heavily
borrowing from the Central Bank to pay insured deposits. Its
borrowings from the Central Bank to support heavier disbursements
for payoff went up from @920 M in 1986 to @1.54 B in 1987.
PDIC's accrued interest payable in 1989 greatly exceeded its
gross income of @189 M for the same year. With the past record
of PDIC, it can be said that it has never been a factor in
maintaining stability and confidence in the financial system.
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Table 19
PAYMENTS MADE BY PDIC IN 1987
No. of Amount Paid
Accounts (P M)
25 Banks closed in 1984 and prioryears 4,703 11.38
42 Banks closed in 1985 26,822 64.29
22 Banks closed in 1986 7,570 16.80
2 Banks closed in 1987 117,006 549.52
91 Banks Serviced 156,101 641.99
Source: PDIC 1987 Annual Report.
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The Central Bank appears to be responsive to bank runs. For
instance, when a bank run occurred during the third quarter of
1984 which was triggered by the unilateral closure of two large
savings banks, the Central Bank increased by threefold its
assistance to financial institutions to prevent it from
developing into a ma3or crisis (See Table 20). To contain the
run during the first and second quarter of 1987 when the PISO
Bank and Manila Bank were closed, the Central Bank increased its
assistance to fin_ancial institutions, thus reversing the
declining trend in the level of Central Bank assistance to
financial institutions established in the immediate four
quarters.
The economy is now on the road to recovery; so is the
financial system. It is worthwhile noting, however, that the
level of Central Bank assistance to financial institutions still
appears to be very high (See Table 20). Indeed, this leaves the
Central Bank very little elbow room to avert a major crisis
without going back to the period of high interest rate. The
presently high ratio of Central Bank assistance to financial
institutions to reserve money suggests that the financial system
is not yet over the hump.
DBP used to be the second largest financial institution in
the country. Between 1980 and 1984, its total assets more than
doubled from P27 B to @67 B (See Table 21). Its lending
activities were mainly financed by time and savings deposits,
which came mostly from the National Government and government-
owned corporations, and long-term borrowings. The proportion of
foreign borrowings to total long-term borrowings markedly
increased during the 1983-84 balance-of-payments crisis as a
result of the sharp devaluation of the peso. DBP's problems
became more pronounced in 1984 when it suffered a substantial
loss of _6.6 B. The huge losses went on for three consecutive
years. The new management team took over DBP and successfully
rehabilitated it. In 1987, DBP made a turnaround and earned a
profit of @783 M. Realized profit increased to _1.6 B in 1988.
It has now restored its normal lending operations with more focus
on wholesale banking.
PNB has been the largest commercial bank in the country.
Like DBP, its assets more than doubled during the period 1980 to
1984 from P38.6 B to @87.2 B (See Table 22). Although it
mobilized deposits from the private sector, it also relied
heavily on deposits from the National Government and semi-
government agencies. It also borrowed heavily from the Central
Bank to sustain its operations. PNB incurred huge losses during
the period 1984-1986 amounting to PII.8 B. Having cleansed of
its non-performing assets in 1986, PNB realized hefty profits of
@i B and @1.8 B in 1987 and 1988, respectively. It has already
started implementing its privatization program by successfully
selling to the public 30 percent of its total outstanding
shares last July 1989. The public's response to the sale of
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Table 21
SELECTEDFINANCIALSTATISTICS,DBP
(In.M)
3/
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
A, Resources
TotalAssets 27,086,2 34,706.8 43,988.5 54,934.0 66,800.2 72,043.0 9,503.6 I0,531.6 11,432.5
Loans 15,933.8 18,516.5 22,875.4 30,919.7 35,827.6 24,758.0 5,271.1 4.394.5 na
B, TimeandSavin9sDeposits 4,603.9 8,627.6 7,068.5 4,672.3 978.3 1,519,0 561.5 531.6 na
.........................
C. Lon9-termBorrowings
Forei9n 6,333.8 7,635.2 11,459.3 18,860.9 28,853.2 32,295.9
Domestic 8,242.7 10,0.10.111,971.1 14,175.7 14,954.8 12,704.6 2,025,7 1,340.0 na
D. Equity 4,060.1 4,534.8 5,305.9 5,427.7 4,422.5 4,410.8 2,618.2 3,460.8 na
E, IncomeandExpenses
Earnings 2,673,7 3,419.7 4,369.6 5,369.8 2,648.0 3,140.2 2,136.5 t,771.2 2.569.3
Expenses 1/ 2,435.7 3,315.9 4,298.0 5,272.0 8,607.52 8,776.7 8,176.4 965.4 920.0
Net Profit (Loss) 223.1 I08.7 111.3 110.2 (6,640.9) (5636.5)(5,638,2) 782.6 1,649.2
1/
Wetof taxes
2/
P5,48wasfundedbythe NationalGovernment.
3/
Obtainedfro= Philippines' Best 1000Corporations(1989).
...................................
Sources"OBPAnnualReports(variousyears).
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Table 22
SELECTEDFINANCIALSTATISTICS,PNB
(In.M)
1980 1981. 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
A. Resources
Total Assets 38,652.1 44,866.3 58,709,8 70,502.3 87,196.1 76,156.9 26,913.2 31,267.6 38,758.1
LoansandDiscounts 24,419.7 27,410.3 32,894.4 44,502.3 47,893.5 35,319,1 8,658.2 12,406.4 15,124.7
B. DepBsitsOutstanding
Government 4,953.86,465.0 6,280.011,382.7 6,589.6 5,406.7 4,470.8 6,898.2 7,988.1
Semi-Government 1,708.2 1,604.3 2,624.5 2,624.7 3,435.6 5,518.1 796.1 1,233.2 1,348.4
Private 13,069.4 10,935.4 11,375.0 11,128.6 10,178.9 12,512.9 11,590.6 10,998.8 16,837.5
Total 19,731.4 19,004.7 20,279.5 25,136.0 20,204.1 23i439.7 16,857.5 18,930.2 25,952.6
C. BillsPayable
CentralBankBorrowings2,552.9 4,059.9 4,139.7 1,881.9 11,142.5 9,940.7 11.6 0.0 4.2
D. Equity 2,289.0 2,868.8 3,332.1 4,016.6 6,935.8 1,253.7 2,539.5 3,550.0 5,009.3
E. EarningsandExpenses
.....................
Earnings 3,310.3 5,655,6 5,586.4 7,738.3 9,170.8 5,176.1 3,941.2 3,398.1 4,998.3
Expenses 3,099.3 5,425.4 6,427.8 7,503.6 10,272.2 12,393.4 7,.511.3 2,387.6 3,15t.0
NetProfit (Less) 211.0 230.1 158.6 234.7 (1,t02.4) (7,217.3) (3,570.2) 1,010.5 1,847.3
Sources: PNBAnnualReports various years).
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PNB's stocks has been enormous judging from the fact that the
stock offering had Deen oversubscribed. This reflects the
public's confidence in the financial health of PNB. It is
interesting _o note that its borrowing from the Central Bank was
practically nil in 1987 and 1988.
D. Performance of the Rural Banking System
During the final years of the previous regime, the financial
status of rural banking system had seriously deteriorated. In
fact, the greatest number of rural bank failures for the past
fifteen years was recorded in the year preceding the turnover of
government (See Table 23). The closure of 40 rural banks in
1985 resulted in the negative 17.3 percent real growth rate in
the assets of the rural banking system. In 1986, the real growth
rate jumped to 4.2 percent reflecting the improvement of the
financial conditions of some rural banks. After almost three
years of the launching of the rural bank rehabilitation program,
rural bank failures have been kept minimal at four head office
closures in 1988. It is to be noted that rural bank failures
during the 1986-88 period have not been associated with declining
rural banking assets in nominal terms unlike in the previous
period. In real terms, however, assets of rural banking system
have registered positive growth rates in 1986 and 1988 (See Table
24).
As regards the rehabilitation program, the number of rural
banks which were given approval to participate increased
eightfold in 1988 from the 1987 level (See Table 25). Close to
62 percent or 295 of the approved applications as of end-December
1988 have fully complied with the rehabilitation program
requirements with 224 availing themselves of the fresh capital
infusion, while 71 opted to settle 10 percent of total arrearages
with the Central Bank. Fifty-one more rural banks have partially
infused capital bringing a total of 275 rural banks, or roughly
58 percent of the approved applications, availing themselves of
the fresh capital infusion requirement. The increase in rural
bank capitalization due to the fresh capital infusion could be
seen from the increase in nominal terms the capital accounts of
the rural banking system. In real terms, however, capital
accounts have exhibited positive growth rates during the 1986-
1987 period and negative in 1988. But compared to the last two
years of Marcos rule, capital accounts of the rural banking
system have performed better under this government.
Other signs of improving performance of the rural banking
system are becoming visible under the present administration.
The efforts of the government to strengthen rural banking
operations in order to improve its lending activities in the
rural sector elicited a positive response. Rural banks' loan
portfolio began to grow in 1986 at 0.6 percent in real terms
which is an improvement from the negative real growth rate
recorded the previous year (See Table 24). But a negative
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Table 23
NUMBER OF OPERATING RURAL BANKS
1984-1988
Head Extension Offices
Year Office Branches and Money Shops Total
1984 940 109 118 1157
1985 904 108 104 1117
1986 875 109 101 1,084
1987 850 109 101 1060
1988 846
Source: SRO, Central Bank.
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Table 24
SELECT[I)ACCOUNTSOF HERURALBANKINGSYSTEM
1984-1968
(InMillionPesos)
Amts LoanPortfolioDepositLiabilitiesCapitalAccountsTotalBorrowingsOeposit-to_rrowingsRatio
Year
NominalRul NominalReal _ina] Real .NominalRealNomiMI Real (Z)
19849023.3 3365.67022,5 2819.42867,2 1069.5 1305,8 487,13937.7 1468,7 72.8
1885 8821.7 2782.96636.5 2093.53018.7 952.3 1360,5 429,23835,3 1209,9 76,7
1966 8350.5 2961.26780.5 2106.93767.1 1168.8 1451,9 450.53416.4 t060,O 110,3
1967 8960,8 2881,37226.9 2_0.5 4516.3 t306.4 1574,7 455.52759.6 798,3 163.6
198811016.82904.37970.2 2100.75218.3 1375.4 1712,6 451.42682.4 707,0 194.5
kWCe:SILO,CentralBa_.
Table 25
RURAL BANK REHABILITATION PROGRAM
(C8 Circulars 1143, 1158 and 1172)
As of Dec. 14, 1987 As of Dec. 31, 1988
No. of Applications 480 522
Received
No. of Applications 59 476
Approved
No. of Applications 2 27
Denied/Withdrawn/
Disqualified
Source: Agricultural Credit Policy Council
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real growth rate was experienced again in 1987. Although
agricultural loans extended by rural banks grew in absolute
terms, however, its ratio to total loans declined throughout the
1986-1988 period. Likewise, the effort of the Monetary
Authorities to make the rural banking system less dependent on
Central Bank funds has prompted rural banks to mobilize deposits
to finance their lending operations. Deposit liabilities of rural
banks have exhibited impressive real growth rates of 22.7 and
11.8 percent in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In 1988, real
growth rate went down to 5.3 percent but still much higher than
the levels achieved in 1984-85 period. More importantly, rural
banks have reduced their borrowings from the Central Bank, which
is a reversal of their situation before 1986 when they were
heavily dependent on government financial support through the
various subsidized credit programs. The deposit-to-borrowings
ratio for the past three years never went below 100 percent,
suggesting that rural banks have recently intensified their
effor_ to mobilize deposits.
The relatively good performance of the rural banking system
in 1986 and 1987 is reflected in the improvement of their net
income from the levels realized in the 1984-1985 period (See
Table 26). Thus, the return on total assets almost doubled
between 1985 and 1987. The return on bank equity achieved a
similar improvement during the same period. But in real terms,
it was in 1986 that rural banks realized the highest growth rate
in net income under the new administration.
Since rural banks are supposed to be the primary source of
formal credit in the rural areas, strengthening the financial
conditions of the rural banking system would serve as an impetus
to increase the loans extended to the agricultural sector.
Although agricultural loans granted by the formal financial
system increased in absolute terms during the first two years of
Aquino administration, howev :_, its share to total loans has
declined. As of the third quarter of 1988, a slight increase in
the share of agricultural loans to total loans has been recorded,
but still much lower than the levels achieved during the pre-
1986 period (See Table 27). Since the dominant economic
activity in the rural areas is still agriculture-based, the
declining share of agricultural loans could create bottlenecks in
the government's present efforts to implement a full rural
development policy.
E. Interest Rate, Inflation Rate and Exchange Rate
The domestic currency depreciated vis-a-vis the dollar by
only 4.4 percent between February 1986 and February 1989 (See
Figures 2 and 3). This is indeed a remarkable achievement by the
Aquino government since it gives some semblance of stability to
the economy. However, one must closely examine how this was
achieved. The build-up of gross international reserves and low
inflation rates in 1986 and 1987 largely contributed to the
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Table 26
FINANCIAL RATIOS OF THE RURAL BANKING SYSTEM
1984-1988
(In Percent)
Return on Return on Net Income to
Year Total Assets Equity Gross Income
1984 1.1 7,6 9.3
1985 1.0 6.2 7,5
1986 1.7 10.5 13.2
1987 1.9 11.6 15.1
1988 1.7 10.7 13.9
Source: SRO, Central Bank.
"Z8
Table 27
LOANS GRANTED BY THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
TO THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
1981-1988
(Billion Pesos)
Total Share of
Year Agricultural Loans Agriculture
Loans (%)
1981 25.725 275.817 9.3
1982 28.443 304.513 9.3
1983 29.294 365.005 8.0
1984 30.271 366.434 8.3
1985 28.355 287.985 9.8
1986 22.589 298.580 7.6
1987 27.786 379.000 7.3
1988 a/ 27.127 347.800 7.8
a/ January - September, 1988.
Source: Central Bank Statistical Bulletin, Vol. II, 1986.
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Figure 2: NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATE (_/US$)
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stability of the exchange rate during these years (See
Figures 4 and 5). In 1988, however, pressures on the
exchange rate had mounted. Inflation rate went up to about nine
percent while the gross international reserves rapidly
deteriorated. Since reserves were already at critical levels,
theCentral Bank started to use interest rate as an instrument to
defend the domestic currency. As a result, the 91-day treasury
bill rate went up to 16.7 percent per annum in December 1988 from
a low 9.1 percent in January 1987 (See Figure 6). The recent
borrowings from the IMF and the World Bank and part of the new
money currently being negotiated with private bank creditors are
intended to build up the reserves.
As stated in the Plan, a positive real deposit rate will be
maintained to mobilize savings. This objective was met for all
investment instruments in 1986 and 1987 (See Figure 7). In
1987, however, the real rate on savings deposits was negative
although those on time deposits and treasury bills were still
positive. This has a serious implication on savings mobil-
ization. As shown in Table 28, savings deposits comprise about
57 percent of the total deposits of deposit money banks in 1987.
While inflation rate went up in 1988, the interest rate on
savings deposits even went down. Interestingly, the nominal
interest rate on savings deposits of 4.1 percent per annum in
1988 was much lower than the nominal interest rate of six percent
per annum enjoyed by depositors in the early 1970s when it was
still administratively fixed by the Central Bank.
V. SOME POLICY ISSUES
This section discusses some policy issues that must be
addressed by the government.
A. Threat of Policy Reversal
The Monetary Authorities/Executive Branch of the government
has already introduced substantial policy reforms in the
financial sector. In particular, most policy statements
contained in the Plan have already been translated into concrete
policy actions. There is no doubt, therefore, that the financial
sector is now moving towards a more liberal environment.
Further policy reforms currently being contemplated pertain
to those that require legislative actions. In this regard, the
Monetary Authorities/Executive Branch is fortunate enough to
find support from some lawmakers who are willing to carry the
task of further reforming the financial sector in the halls of
Congress. Admittedly, however, while there are lawmakers who are
sympathetic to the ongoing policy reforms, others have introduced
bills that tend to reverse the policy reforms. The proposed
policies in these bills bear the familiar hallmarks of a
repressed financial system, viz, ceilings on lending rates, loan
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Table 28
PERCENT SHARE OF THE DIFFERENT TYPES
OF DEPOSITS TO TOTAL DEPOSITS
Demand Savings Time Deposit Total Deposits
Year Deposits Deposits Deposits Substitutes (PM)
1967 32.3 43.3 24.4 0.0 5790.2
1968 33.0 46.1 20.9 0.0 6121.1
1969 34.8 46".8 18.5 0.0 6827.9
1970 32.8 53.7 13.,6 0.0 6977.9
1971 32.2 54.4 13.3 0.0 7843.6
19"72 36.0 51.5 12.5 0.0 8436.5
1973 26.1 39.4 6.8 27.7 14610.6
1974 23.6 33.5 5.5 37.5 19931.0
1975 23.1 30.2 6.8 39.9 24137.0
1976 21.2 30.4 12.4 35.9 30245.6
1977 22.1 31.0 16.3 30.6 37203.5
1978 20.2 34.3 19.'2 26.3 43702.2
1979 20.1 35.1 20.1 24.8 48178.3
1980 21.4 33.9 23.2 21.5 57628.6
1981 16.9 34.3 25.4 23.3 70465.5
1982 13.1 35.0 31.8 20.1 82588.6
1983 13.8 36.5 31.4 18.3 93354.8
1984 11.9 38.4 38.3 11.3 99417.3
1985 10.8 42.6 38.6 7.9 108816.4
1986 11.9 54.2 29.6 4.3 111828".9
1987 13.4 57.1 26.6 2.9 123780.4
Source of Basic Data: Central Bank
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portfolio requirements for certain sectors of the economy, and
tax exemptions. Records of congressional hearings of these bills
indicate that the Central Bank has consistently expressed its
objections to the bills that tend to halt or reverse the
recently initiated financial policy reforms. However, instead of
confining itself to commenting on bills that propose some policy
reversals or defending its current policy reforms, it may well be
for the Central Bank to take an aggressive stance without
necessarily being confrontational. One way of doing it is to
establish a permanent communication line with Congress that would
serve as a venue for explaining the general financial policies
and ongoing policy reforms pursued by the government and for
commenting on bills being contemplated before they are formally
filed in Congress.
B. Stability of the Bankinq System
There is an urgency to improve the stability of the banking
system. Past experience suggests that the incidence of bank
failure falls more heavily on depositors. As shown in Table 29,
out of the P5.8 B deposits of closed banks from 1970 to 1986,
only 42 percent or @2.4 B were insured. What is worse is that
PDIC has yet to pay 23 percent of the total insured deposits of
closed banks.
While the general economic condition has contributed to bank
failures, insider abuse or fraud has played a much larger part
(See Lamberte 1989). The current efforts to strengthen the
supervisory function of the Central Bank with more focus on
reducing insider abuse is a step in the right direction. While
the Central Bank is now in the process of weeding out weak and/or
mismanaged banks, it must be tempered with a liberal bank entry
policy so as not to reduce people's access to banking services.
Although the Central Bank has already announced the termination
of its moratorium on the giving of new bank licenses, it still
remains to be seen whether it is going to approve application for
opening a new bank or branch in an area where there is no bank or
the bank has been closed without necessarily compelling new
entrants to buy the closed bank.
There is definitely a need to increase the insurance fund of
PDIC so that it can promptly pay insured deposits in toto. Even
if depositors cannot redeem entirely their deposits with closed
banks, the knowledge that they can quickly claim their deposits
covered by insurance can help strengthen their confidence in the
banking system.
C. Interest Rate and Exchanqe Rate Policy
The use of interest rate to defend the exchange rate has
induced more volatile and high domestic interest rate. This
could produce a leftward shift of the aggregate supply curve -
la "structuralist approach" - that would eventually lead to
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Table 29
DEPOSITORS"LOSSESOUETO BANKFAILURES,1970-1986
(In_P'M)
Typeof Bank No.of OutstandingEstimatedDepositors'PDIC Depositors'
Bank5 Depositsl/ Insured Losses PaymentsReceivable
Closed Deposits fromPDIC
CommercialBanks 5 3,@29,4 2B0.2 2,749.2 11B.9 161,3
SavingsandMortgageBanks 3 1,015,6 954.9 68.7 767.4 187.5
PrivateDevelopmentBanks 3 163.7 127.7 36.g I17,B Ig.7
StockSLAs 24 1,3Bg.5 853.8 446.7 7B9,3 114.5
RuralBanks 154 266.9 IB5.2 BI.7 135.3 49.9
Total 189 5,776.4 2,4BI,7 3,374.7 I,B47.B 553.?
IIAs ofthedateof closure.Figuresareon a cumulativebasis.
5ourceof BasicData: PDIC19B6AnnualReport.
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higher inflation rate which is what the present policy of
stabilizing the exchange rate is trying to avoid. Of course, the
biggest casualty of having an overvalued currency and high
domestic interest rate is the export sector. Although this
measure is deemed temporary since reserves will be built up again
which would relieve the pressure on the exchange rate, one must,
however, examine closely the manner by which reserves are going
to be increased. The present strategy of borrowing from
multilateral agencies and private bank creditors may not be a
good one. In the past, the availability of foreign loans had
actually reduced the willingness to make the necessary adjustment
in the exchange rate to correct the balance-of-payments problem.
The best alternative strategy to build up reserves is
through increased exports. But thisrequiresan adjustment in
the exchange rate to a realistic level. In one of the chapters
below, it is shown that the performance of the export sector is
closely associated with movements of thereal effective exchange
rate.
D. Special Credit Programs
As discussed above, there are still a number of special
credit programs being managed by non-financial government
agencies. Some of them have appeared only recently and carry
concessionary rates. The sad history of special credit programs
in terms of repayment rates and its redistributive impact s_ould
have been enough to convince policymakers to discontinue and/or
avoid creating such programs (See Lamberte and Lim 1987). In a
separate study, Lamberte et al0 (1989) have suggested that the
funds allocated to these programs be consolidated and used to
augment resources of the existing guarantee programs. The
guarantee programs call for a cost-sharing between the government
and private banks. Moreover, a high gearing ratio (i.e., about
5) of a guarantee fund would have a wider reach compared to a
direct lending program.
Since credit is fungible, widening the scope of guarantee
programs rather than maintaining numerous credit programs could
be more effective in inducing the flow of credit to the rural
sector. Thus, the consolidation of several separate loan funds
for various commodity programs into the Comprehensive
Agricultural Loan Fund is an achievement in streamlining the
number of existing credit programs. Likewise, the gradual
disengagement of government agencies from direct lending could
help eliminate the "dole out" mentality among rural borrowers.
It must be noted that the leniency shown by the previous
administration in penalizing non-repayment of loans extended by
government agencies has produced this kind of mentality, which
now impairs the successful implementation of special credit
programs. Lastly, the implementation of credit programs should
be undertaken by financial institutions which have the facilities
in determining credit-worthy projects and borrowers.
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E. Rural Bank Rehabilitation
Both the Legislative Branch and the Monetary
Authorities/Executive Branch have introduced substantial policy
reforms that seek to improve the financial status of the rural
banking system. Similarly, private sector involvement has been
reflected in the significant number of rural bank owners which
opted to infuse fresh capital as a requirement to the rural bank
rehabilitation program. Thus, as a whole, the effort of the
present administration to rehabilitate financially distressed
rural banks has gained the support of the different sectors of
society. But in terms of implementing policy reforms that are
supposed to create an environment truly supportive of the
operations of rural banks, there is still a great challenge that
this administration needs to consider. For instance, some
lawmakers in the Legislative Branch seek to reimplement past
policies on rural lending which include loan fixing and even the
use of CB rediscounting facility for rural banks. Though these
policies aim to ensure a sustained flow of credit to the rural
sector, experience shows that the results of such policies had
caused the sad plight of rural banks during the previous regime.
Most of them became dependent on highly subsidized credit and
overlooked the other important function of a bank, i.e., deposit
mobilization. Likewise, their dependence on government-
supported credit has made them vulnerable to government budgetary
deficit. Thus, when public funds dried up, many rural banks got
into trouble.
In this regard, there is a need to examine thoroughly these
proposed policies and find out how they could complement the
present rural bank rehabilitation program in particular, and the
improvement of the rural financial market in general. It is
important to note that the recent performance of the rural
banking system is quite impressive despite the absence of highly
subsized credit and loan portfolio requirements. Thus, policies
that make rural banks less dependent on Central Bank borrowings,
or conversely, more dependent on deposits for their lending
operations should be widely pursued by this administration. It
has now become clearer that the rural areas have large untapped
savings waiting for the right incentives to flow into the formal
banking system.
As regards financial intermediation in the rural areas, the
opening of a new rural bank should not be inhibited by rigorous
requirements (i.e., minimum capital requ'irements, etc.). Thus,
there is a need to pursue banking policies that facilitate the
process of opening a new bank such as cutbacks in paper
requirements, elimination of red tapes, etc. Likewise, previous
stockholders/owners of closed rural banks who have anomalous
records should not be permitted to operate a new rural bank to
insure a more Dredible rural banking system. Finally, on the
part of the government, a fair treatment should be extended to
all rural banks in terms of enforcing standard requirements on
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banking operations. Special treatment or favor accorded to
certain individuals or groups by the government should be highly
discouraged.
VI. SUMMARY
This paper assesses the performance of the Aquino
administration in the financial sector. It discusses the reforms
in the financial sector initiated by the present government as
spelled out in the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 1986-
1992 and their impact on the performance of the financial sector.
This paper categorizes the individual policy reforms under
six major groupings: improvement of the financial structure,
improvement of t_e rural credit market, rationalization of
government regulations affecting intermediation cost, continued
adoption of a market-determined interest rate, development of
domestic capital market, and prudent monetary management. Under
each grouping, actual policy actions taken up by both the
Monetary Authorities/Executive Branch and Legislative Branch are
discussed separately. Each concrete policy action is evaluated
in terms of its consistency (or inconsistency) with the reforms
called for in the Plan. Thus, concrete policy actions that
complement and/or contradict the planned policy reforms are
equally highlighted.
One general result of the study shows that the Monetary
Authorities/Executive Branch have already made substantial
progress as far as implementing the desired policy reforms under
existing laws. Congress has also responded to the call for
policy reforms particularly those that require legislative
actions. These actually complement the policy actions desired by
the Monetary Authorities/Executive Branch. For instance, under
the issue of improving the financial structure, both sides have
taken up a similar stand to protect banks from overextending
loans to favored groups. On the part of the Monetary
Authorities, a CB circular has been issued putting a loan limit
on single borrowers, while on the part of the Legislative Branch,
a House bill has been filed prescribing limits on loans or
accommodations which financial institutions including government
banks may grant to borrowers. On another aspect, under the
objective of improving the rural credit market, some lawmakers
have filed bills seeking to provide incentives to financial
intermediaries operating in rural areas to encourage bank
competition. These complement the Central Bank's current policy
of freer entry and branching in the rural areas by abolishing the
requirement on prerequisite investment in government securities.
Likewise, some lawmakers in Congress have proposed the abolition
of the GRT and the repeal of agri-agra requirement to reduce bank
intermediation costs.
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Congress is not a monolithic institution, however. Some
bills being filed suggest reversal of policies which have been
recently initiated by the Monetary Authorities. One example
pertains to the proposal in Congress, supported by a handful of
lawmakers, to extend the loan portfolio requirements of financial
institutions to other sectors other than agriculture and agrarian
reform beneficiaries. Another bill recommends conversion of
arrearages of rural banks with the Central Bank into government
equity. This could undermine the current rural bank
rehabilitation program which calls for greater participation on
the part of bank owners/stockholders.
The efforts of the Aquino administration to deregulate and
improve the performance of the financial system have produced
some positive results. Total resources of the financial system
have registered positive real growth rates beginning 1987 since
it was hit by BOP crisis in 1983. However, real assets of the
financial system in 1988 are still much lower than the pre-crisis
period. In terms of deposit generation, although real growth
rates are still negative, a marked improvement has been noted in
1986-87 from the 1984-85 growth rates. Likewise, real growth
rate in lending operations of the financial system rebounded in
1987. But demand, short-term, and intermediate-term lending
largely account for such improvement. Long-term lending lags
behind and even deteriorated from the 1986 level reflecting the
failure to develop the long-term capital market. The relatively
better performance of the financial system can be gathered from
the ratios of loans to deposits and deposits to assets.
Beginning 1986, close to 40 percent of the total assets of the
financial system were financed by deposits. The use of deposit
resources in sustaining lending activities has also improved
under this administration.
As regards the rehabilitation of GFIs, PNB and DBP realized
impressive profits in 1987 and 1988 after the transfer of their
non-performing assets to the National Government. Rural banks,
likewise, have exhibited improvement in their performance during
the 1986-1987 after the implementation of the rural bank
rehabilitation program.
The remarkably slow depreciation of the domestic currency
vis-a-vis the dollar could be taken as a symbol of stability in
the economy. However, the manner by which this was achieved can
be questioned. Pursuing a high interest rate policy and
borrowing more from abroad to build up reserves could be more
catastrophic in the long run than making the necessary adjustment
in the exchange rate now in the face of an increasingly large
current account deficit.
9O
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